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Review of Economic Forecasts
for the Transition Period
Michael Sapir
The author wishes to express his appreciation for comments and sug-
gestions by various colleagues in Washington and elsewhere both before
and after the 1946 Conference on Research in Income and Wealth.
He wantsto make grateful acknowledgement to Mildred C. Allen
and Ora Lee Ackerman for their splendid assistance at all stages of
preparing this paper.
When this paper was written, the author was employed as an econ-
omist in the Bureau of the Budget.The views expressed are, however,
entirely his own responsibility, and in no way officially or unofficially
reflect policies or judgments of the Budget Bureau or any other fed-
eral agency.VSETTING ANDPURPOSE
Between V-E and V-J Day there developed, especially in Wash-
ington, a feeling of acute need for projections of broad economic
trends during the transition period from war to peace. The extent
and timing of tax policy changes, wage adjustments, and elim-
ination of the whole elaborate structure of price, rationing, and
other wartime controls were seen to hinge on the probable course
of production, income, and employment as war expenditures were
cut-back and the armed forces were demobilized.
Throughout the war, forecasting the pace of the economy was
a useful tool of policy formation and administration. On the whole
the record of these forecasts was good, in view of the large ele-
ments of the economy that were under controls. Although confi-
dence was gained in manipulating the basic data and various
analytical techniques, it was generally recognized that to forecast
correctly a dynamic change in the over-all economic climate was
far more difficult.
The setting for these transition forecasts was the high plateau
of economic activity at the peak of the war effort in 1944 and
early 1945 and the certainty of a rapid cut-back. (In fact, war
expenditures and consequently output and employment in muni-
tions industries began to fall significantly after V-E Day; it was
clear that the pace after V-J Day would be greatly accelerated.)
The major purpose of the projections was to serve as a guide and
warning to policy makers with respect to the decontrol of wartime
measures and the framing of correct policy decisions generally.
The present analysis of the period since V-J Day is designed to
shed light on some reasons for the errors in the principal forecasts
discussed in this paper. However, it can be considered also a
search for a convincing explanation of what actually occurred.
Postmortems as such either are of purely historical interest or may
tend to take on a condemnatory or an excusatory character. They
can be however, if they attempt objectively to ana-
lyze the types of factor involved, separating as far as possible
those which might have been foreseen from those which cannot in
fairness be charged to lack of analytical skill or judgment. This is
extremely difficult. But it is the only way by which future work
can benefit from past mistakes.'
1Inthis connection it may not be amisstopoint out that more systematic gain
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THE ROLE OF POLICY
A crucial question in forecasting is how far probable or possible
future changes in policy should explicitly be assumed. All fore-
casting, of course, is based on assumptions. Does this mean that
the sole or chief assumption should be that the federal policy ex-
isting at the time the forecasts are made will be perpetuated?
Shall oniy certain or highly probable policy changes be taken into
account? Or shall an attempt be made to appraise the strength of
political forces and the probable or possible major shifts that may
occur in economic policy and that will vitally affect the texture of
the economic situation in the future?
The answer is of prime methodological significance. Should
economists be political seers, public opinion analysts, and lay
psychiatrists? Should they at least consult experts, who are per-
haps better qualified to chart the course of Congressional action,
to take the pulse of the veteran, the consumer, the business men,
concerning postwar behavior?
The forecasts by federal agencies for the transition did make
specific assumptions concerning policy. Not thought of as forecasts,
nor yet quite as recommendations, they attempted to be perhaps
something of both. From this viewpoint one may argue that what
was attempted was not really economic forecasts at all, but rather
merely a set of model projections, under specified and more or less
plausible conditions.2 Tax reduction, both personal and corporate,
was a foregone conclusion, and the broad pattern of the probable
may be got from analyzing the erroneous forecasts of the 'model builders' than
from studying the more correct forecasts of those whose method depended more
explicitly on general qualitative considerations or at any rate less elaborate quan-
titative techniques. In the writer's view to make forecasting a sound and realistic
activity will always require a proper blending of quantitative and qualitative
factors, an interplay of mechanical, historical-analytical, and judgmental factors.
One is forced to the view that at least at present this activity partakes of .the na-
ture of an art rather more than a scientific process. To claim otherwise, as some
do, seems unnecessarily pretentious.
2Thespecific Washington projections discussed below are those Everett Hagen
describes in 'Forecasting Gross National Product and Employment During the
Transition Period: An Example of the 'Nation's Budget' Method', Studies in
Income and Wealth, Volume Ten.Hagen's results and methods are substantiallyREVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 277
changes was well known. Actually tax policy was softer than we
had assumed. The forecasts were in terms of first half of 1945 (or
1944) price levels and we assumed that there would be no impor-
taut change in the structure of wage-price controls or policy. This
set of assumptions turned out to be wrong. Should the forecaster
have made another set (or sets) based on expectations of various
degrees of price rise and wage adjustment? I think there is no
doubt that a range of forecasts, positing alternative levels of taxa-
tion, prices, and wages, would be safer and sounder. The conse—
quences of pegging to one set of assumptions only will be analyzed
below.
Sound method probably calls also not for forecasts of specific
concrete magnitudes—gross national product of $160 billion or
unemployment of 8 million, etc .—but for probability ranges
around the figures, based at least on hunches or calculated error
bands. This is certainly safer and more in keeping with our present
state of knowledge and technique.3 Another possibility is then
raised: perhaps the range within which forecasts or projections can
safely be made, given certain assumptions, is too wide for mean-
ingful policy guidance. For example, a forecast of real gross
product to which an error band of + or —10 billion dollars must
be applied means a difference of perhaps 5 or 6 million in the corre-
sponding estimate of employment—and unemployment—between
the extremes of the range. Obviously quite different policies are
called for at such different levels. We may simply have to recog-
representative of several similar sets done in the federal government during the
same period; with one of these efforts the writer was himself deeply involved.
Hagen, in his opening words, clearly indicates the character of his figures:
"The purpose of this paper is to illustrate a method of forecasting. .. ."This
statement did not save us from having the projections treated as straight forecasts
by the profession, the press, and business.In a sense the hedge implied in the
above quotation is not quite legitimate, psychologically if not methodologically.
In focusing attention on Hagen's projections there is no intention to put them
by implication in a more unfavorable light than others.In fact, his are at many
points more reasonable and better.Rather they were chosen as a matter of
expediency: they are representative, they have been published, and it is easier to
deal in extenso with one rather than several sets of tables.
Lawrence Klein ha$ been a consistent proponent of such an approach.278 PART IV
nize a wide gap between the needs of policy makers andpoten-
tialities of our present tools and techniques; yet forecasts and
model projections must be drawn.4
ACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS VS. WASHINGTON FORECASTS:
SUMMAñY
Given the current and expected cut-backs in war expenditures, the
critical questions in the spring and summer of 1945 concerned the
absorptive capacity and resiliency of the civilian economy;
whether the primary impact would be quickly offset or would pre-
cipitate a series of further deflationary repercussions.
The general history of the more widely known forecasts made
in Washington is by now familiar. Their whole tone and emphasis
was on the drastic primary impact of curtailed government out-
lays—followed by further derived effects—on the levels of income
and employment in the private economy. A strong deflationary
tendency was predicted, despite recognized counterforces; in
Hagen's projections, over eight million unemployed were forecast
for the first quarter of 1946, with a steady decline
Actual developments since V-J Day have been drastically dif-
ferent. Our quantitative mistakes—$20 billion low on gross
national product, disposable income, and consumption, or 4 to 5
million high on. unemployment—are not as disastrous as our quali-
tative. Quantitative errors kindle the rhetoric of hostile newspaper
writers who love to point an accusing finger at 'Washington econo-
mists'. But we forecast deflation, deficiencies of demand, a ten-
dency for prices to fall,6 sizable unemployment, a rather bearish
mood in the business world. Instead, inflationary pressures have
been constant and general: prices and wages have risen, incomes
For a more optimistic view on the usefulness of projections for policy guidance,
even if the forecast interval covers the possibility of either inflation or deflation,
see Klein's comments on this paper.
Other projections, based on an even more pessimistic view of the cumulative
deflationary pressure caused by the primary impact of reduced war outlays,
showed unemployment continuing to increase beyond the first quarter.
6Thoughemphasizing strongly the inevitable co-existence of strong inflationary
pressures in a great many specific markets and commodities, so that price and
other stabilization controls would continue to be needed.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC rOREC)iSTs 279
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are at record levels, sustaining demands far above available sup-
plies; employment, after the first shock on the munitions industries
has been high, and in no month since Y-J Day has unemployment
been more thanmillion.
Some have argued that the deflationary forecasts influenced
the administration, inducing it to adopt wrong policies, i.e., too
'soft' a tax policy and too lax an administration of price and wage
controls—practices contrary to the views and recommendations
of the economists. But economists have far less direct influence on
the shaping of policy than is
It is more fruitful now to turn to a summary examination of the
factual record; to analyze the factors accounting for the errors of
forecast; and thereby to glean what insights we can that may be
of use in future work.
TABLE 1
Gross National Expenditures, First Half 1945andFiscal 1946
First half
1945
Fiscal 1946 % change from first





















Private gross capital formation
Consumer expenditures
Disposable income
Actual data, in current prices, are from the Department of Commerce. The f ore-
casts are in first half of 1945 prices.
*Seasonallyadjusted annual rates. These figures are somewhat revised from those
used as a basis for the projections. See Appendix tables.
The essential data comparing actual with forecast developments
for fiscal 1946 are shown in Table 1 and Chart 1. The forecasts are
couched in terms of first half of 1945 price levels. That is, they
assumed no essential changes from that level and structure of
prices. Predicated on a firm stabilization policy, the aim was to
A.G. Hart, in an otherwise critical and polemical article in the American Eco-
nomic Review, September 1946, is on this point correct. He suggests that a chief
result of the forecasts was to weaken the economists' effectiveness in opposing
inflationary policies, and the over-hasty dismantling of wartime controls ('Na-
tional Budgets and National Policy: a Rejoinder', p. 635).War and
CHART I
Postwar Trends in Gross National Product
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forecast levels of real output. The forecast levels of income, based
on current dollar relations with gross national product, were more
cautious. Although price indexes by which to deflate gross national
product and income flows are grossly inadequate, both conceptu-
ally and statistically, the crudest attempts have nevertheless been
made to suggest the importance of the price factor in the rise of
economic activity since V-J Day and thus in the gap between
actual and forecast levels.8 We shall return to the question whether
prices can be handled merely descriptively in this fashion or have
to be given a more positive and 'causative' role in explaining the
• transition period thus far.
How does the record look? For fiscal 1946—approximately the
year after V-J Day—the forecasts underestimated gross national
product by 10 percent (current dollars), consumer expenditures
by 13 percent, and disposable income by nearly 11 percent. In
first half of 1945 prices (roughly) the corresponding underesti-
mates for the first two items are 6 and 11 percent respectively (see
App. III). The total labor force (including the armed forces) was
overestimated on the average by 2.5 million, or 4 percent; the
civilian labor force was overestimated by only 1 million, or 2 per-
cent. Civilian employment was underestimated by 3 million, or
6 percent (offset largely by an error in the opposite direction for
the size of the armed forces). Unemployment, estimated as a resid-
ual category (labor force minus employment), was overestimated
by 4 million for the year,9 an error of 186 percent L Obviously this
small residual item reflects the total effect of errors in the larger
• components. Yet it is of course the error drawing the most caustic
criticism from the press and elsewhere.'°.
The forecast and actual events for the fourth quarter of 1945
8Thedeflated figures and comparisons are in Appendix 111. The essential nature
of the forecasting errors is not altered by making primary comparisons with actual
data at current prices.
The error is greatest in the last half of fiscal 1946 (see App. Table 5).
10Suchcriticisms are in general quite unfair and full of animus. It should be
admitted, however, that from a policy standpoint the estimate of unemployment
is critical, since so many types of action hinge on its actual or expected size. Yet
this is the magnitude we are least able to forecast (or even estimate!) with reason-
able Here is a concrete instance of the present inadequacy of our statis-
tical and analytical tools'for of short-term policy.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 283
and the first quarter of 1946 are more instructive, for it was in.
these quarters that deflation and unemployment were expected
to appear on a big scale. In a fundamental sense what occurred in
thiscrucialhalf year was bound to determine the later course of
events.
For the fourth quarter a gross national product of $165 biffion
was forecast (it was $198 billion in 1944), and $207 billion in the
first half of 1945 (adjusted annual rate). Actually gross national
product in current dollars ran at an annual rate of $185 billion or
13 percent above the forecast. (The difference in first half of 1945
• dollars was roughly 8 percent: see App. III). Private capital for-
mation was underestimated by $2 billion or 15 percent; consumer
expenditures by $17 billion, or 15 percent in current dollars. Fore-
•cast disposable income was off 12 percent, while total civilian em-
ployment was 3.5 million or about 7 percent low. Partly in conse-
quence, unemployment was predicted at a level 4.5 million above
the actual figure, 1.9 million.
TABLE2
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The actual figures for fiscal 1946 are based on Monthly Report on the Labor Force
data. with rough unofficial adjustments both to allow for seasonal factors and to
put them on a level comparable with the old MRLF series, i. e., prior to July 1945,
on which the projections were based.
In the first quarter of 1946 the error in the forecast for gross
national product was of about the same magnitude as in the pre-
ceding quarter. However, private capital formation (including the
foreign trade balance) was missed by 42 and 41 percent (roughly)
in current and in. first half of 1945 prices respectively. Consump-
tion expenditures, running at a rate of $121 billion, were $21.5
billion or 22 percent above the forecast figure. Even allowing for284 PARTIV
the price rise, real consumption was underestimated by 16 per-
cent. For this quarter total civilian employment was underesti-
mated by 4.8 million or 9.5 percent while unemployment was pre-
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Actual data from the Department of Commerce.
TABLE 4





























See note to Table 2.
The margin of error in the forecasts, those for unemployment
aside, averages 10—15 percent on the whole, somewhat less if the
price increase factor is taken into account. It cannot be claimed
that this is a very good record! A quantitative error of this size in
the opposite direction would, however, have hurt far less, for it
would have meant judging the economic climate accurately and
would have strengthened the bid of economists for a more signifi-
cant role in policy-determination. It also undoubtedly would have
altered the policy recommendations somewhat.CHART 2
War and Postwar Trends in the Labor Force
Actual and Forecast Levels
(1939—44 Annual Data; First 1-laif of 1945 and Quarters of Fisccit 1946)
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NATURE OF THE 'MODEL SYSTEM'
A few words are in order about the nature of the assumptions and
the methods of analysis used in Hagen's projections. A fuller and
more systematic presentation is deferred to Appendix IL
The group of federal government economists whose forecasts
('model projections') are here under review are in general Keyne-
sians in methods of analysis and in general philosophy.
approaching the analysis of the economic outlook for the transi-
tion period, it was natural to operate in terms of the over-all sys-
tem of economic relationships developed by Keynes and subse-
quent writers. Increasingly these systems have been elaborated
by econometricians into imposing mathematical models; more and
more empirical statistical work has been done to give specific con-
tent to the analytical functions employed. The general framework
for the analysis is usually some set of gross national product-
national income accounts.
• The econometric model employed by the Washington fore-
casters in mid-1945 is a simplified type of Keynesian model. The
levels of output and employment in the economy as a whole de-
pend on the level and distribution of effective demand for the final
output. Whereas Keynes' theory is concerned with a complete
system of mutually determining interrelationships, the presçnt
approach is truncated and simplified to suit the peculiar nature
of the period. There is no explicit private investment function.
Large parts of consumption are treated as independent of general
levels of income and employment. A large part of total production
and expenditures is arbitrarily determined, i.e., classified as auton-
omous (exogehous) variables. Whereas Keynes stresses the real
relations, e.g., between consumption and income, most of the
models used for the transition period were based on money rela-
tionships. Finally, the system was exceedingly simple and essen-
tially static in that it involved no lags, rates of change, or expec-
tational variables.
The determination of just which elements are actually 'autono-.
mous', and precisely in what sense, is a matter subject to consider-
able ambiguity and dispute.. The central notion is that, for the
period in question, at least, the levels, rates of change, etc. of thea
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items are totally or effectively independent of the general or ex-
pected level of economic activity. The considerations that lead to
classifying any item as autonomous may vary greatly; and in
reviewing the results it is of some significance whether supply or
demand limitations have led to the classification of an item as
autonomous.
Federal government expenditures were taken as given by
settled-on rates of cut-back in war expenditures," rates of demo-
bilization of the armed forces, the necessary servicing of the public
debt, and an expected stickiness in the size of civilian government
payroll and other normal outlays. State and local government
expenditures were simply assumed to rise slowly from wartime
levels as needed public works projects were undertaken, public
school teaching staffs expanded, and the like. It can, of course, be
argued that large segments of government expenditures or receipts
are dependent in some fashion on the general economic situation;
e.g., tax yields are obviously dependent on the level of income,
while tax rate policy, social security activity, public works outlays,
etc. are or may be geared to actual or expected levels of employ-
ment or unemployment. Nevertheless, for the postwar
period it was reasonable on the whole to think of government
expenditures (receipts not as clearly) as an autonomous item in
the aggregate.
About private expenditures by business and consumers it is far
more difficult to be sure. In general it was assumed that demand
for investment goods by business and for durable goods and rental
housing by consumers, whatever their ultimate relation to income,
prices, etc., would in the short-run far exceed supply. Technical
reconversion problems, labor and materials shortages, and other
problems on the supply side would inevitably set upper limits on
and actually determine the rate of expenditures. In this sense only,
therefore, outlays for business plant and equipment, accumulation
of inventories, residential construction, consumer durable goods,
11Itwas taken for granted that neither war outlays nor the size of the army and
navy would be 'artificially' maintained in order to prevent or offset unemploy-
ment or a threatened depression. On the other hand, no effort was made to substi-
tute faster cut-backs and demobilization rates even though many persons felt
the 'official' schedules were implausible.288 PART IV
and payments for rental housing were proximately taken as
autonomous expenditures.12
The forecast expenditures for these items were. assumed more
or less independently of one another and of general economic activ-
ity. Nevertheless, this independence was vaguely tempered by
qualitative consideration of what business men's expectations for
the transition would be.
With assumptions about tax policy (types and rates of taxes)
for specific periods, and assumptions about military and civilian
transfer payment policy (the latter chiefly the average unemploy-
ment compensation per unemployed person), the forecasters
worked out approximate relations between levels of income pay-
ments and disposable income and levels of gross national product
(in some variants, private gross product). In general the forecasters
were less certain, about the way the income generated by gross
national product would be distributed among wages, profits, entre-
preneurial income, etc., especially in view of the assumption of
constant price levels; Hagen's forecasts are therefore properly
quite tentative on this point.
Given levels of the autonomous items of expenditure (including
parts of consumption) and given an expected relation between
gross national product and disposable income (for a given time
period, with a given tax policy, etc.), the 'passive' or derived
component of consumer expenditures (nondurable goods and serv-
ices excluding rentals) could be projected. A simple set of equa-
12Someobscurity concerning the treatment of business investment outlays cannot
be fully cleared up. In the forecasts cognizance was taken of the results obtained
in a Department of Commerce survey of business intentions to invest in the year
after V-E Day. This expected level of 'demand' was in part related, of course,
to expected high levels of economic activity and sales by industry; in part, how-
ever, the plans to invest were apparently tempered by realistic appraisal of
minimum needs or of the probable availability of goods. Certainly economists in
Washington were aware of the complex relations and the mutual interdependence
between investment demand and other factors in the economic system. There is
no satisfactory systematic explanation as yet, however, of the form or nature of
the relations, long- or short-run. It might be argued that the forecasts did really
treat investment as a partly derived related obscurely to recent and ex-
pected levels of business, but that no mathematical or other explicit function was
used. This is Hagen's position. The quantitative results of the forecasts would
probably not be seriously atTected in any case.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 289
tions constituting the model employed could then be solved to
give an equilibrium position at which the demand for (expendi-
tures on) final goods and services would be equal to the estimated
level of output, the associated level of income would be consistent
with the level of gross national product and consumer expendi-
tures, etc. Estimates of employment and unemployment were then
derived by the methods indicated in Appendix II, given assump-
tions about output per man and hours of work.
Much more complicated and sensitive models, with different
functional relationships, etc. are being applied by other workers
in the field.'3 However, though theoretically and logically more
sound, and though possibly more reliable as a normal procedure,
they would hardly have saved the forecasters from the pitfalls
that snared them. The crucial matter seems rather to be the rela-
tive roles played by mechanical-quantitative analysis on the one
hand and qualitative judgment factors based on historical experi-
ence, intuitive insights, etc. on the
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ERRORS
The broad nature of the record and comparisons between actual
post V-J events and Hagen's projections have already been sum-
marized. Anyone interested in the details, in further clues to what
went wrong and why, may consult the Appendix tables.
It is more worth while now to analyze actual and forecast events,
to venture hypotheses of explanation, to test them for their reason-
ableness and their possible relative significance in the total picture.
As will become clearer below, no single hypothesis explains the
results completely and satisfactorily.. We forecasters misjudged
critical elements in 'the postwar situation; various factors entirely
See,e.g., Lawrence Klein, 'The Use of Econometric Models as a Guide to Eco-
nomic Policy', Econórnetrica, Vol. 15, No. 2, April 1947.
LawrenceKlein did make in 1945 an unpublished set of forecasts for the transi-
tion period, using econometric models. His estimates turned out to be far closer
to the actual record. However, it is this writer's feeling that Klein's own explana-
tion in the Journa' of Politica' Economy for August 1946 is not wholly convincing
(ef. Sec. A4). Nevertheless, a sharp line cannot be drawn concerning the accuracy
of forecasts between Keynesian model-builders and all others. There were hits and
misses in all schools of thought, though W. S. Woytinsky is probably right that
the model builders came off worst; see his 'What Was Wrong in Forecasts of Post-
war Depression', Journal of Political Economy, LV, 2, April 1947, p. 143.290 S PARTIV
unforeseen and in part unforeseeable were operative. Necessarily
therefore our attempt to perform a post?ñortem must be many-
sided. Our ordinarily complex social economy has been through
5 or 6 years of world conflict; it is now going, through the myriad
readjustments to the postwar political and economic situation.
Antagonistic group interests; the desjre for better things on the
part of the consumer, the veteran, the industrial worker; the
psychological let-up after years of tension and shortages; all these
and many other strands are interwoven in the texture of our tran-
sition experience.
The principal explanations and hypotheses be classified
for convenience under three headings:
A Misjudgment of economic factors and relationships
1 Errors of assumption about levels and trends of autonomous
expenditures
2 Misclassification of items as autonomous
3 Relation of disposable income to gross national product
(chiefly attributable to changes in policy, see below)
4 Choice of consumption function
5 Importance of accumulated liquid assets and deferred de-
mand
6 Other factors: price trends and expectations; speed of recon-
version; and supplies of goods -
BMisjudgment of socio-psychological factors
1 Consumer behavior=—postwar spree?
2 Veteran psychology—labor force; spending
3 Business man's outlook—bullishness; realization of consumer
psychology
C Differences in policy from those assumed (chiefly affecting A3)
1 Tax changes: corporate and personal
2 Price control: farm prices; cost of living
3 Wage control
4 Demobilization rates and G.I. benefits
A ECONOMIC FACTORS AND RELATIONSHIPS
AlLevels and trends of autonomous expenditures
In over-all terms the error of forecast in the autonomous expendi-
itures does not seem foimidably large App; I, Table 9): De-.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 291
fined to include all the items treated as autonomous in the set of
Washington projections under review, the total error for fiscal
1946 was about $4.3 billion, only about 2.3 percent of gross na-
tional product. For the fourth quarter of 1945 the error was $4.9
billion; in the first quarterof 1946 it was only $2.7 billion. Never-
theless, the total effect of this error on the forecasts was not insig-
Furthermore, it is probably fruitful to consider the
differences in composition of the autonomous factors, since it may
be supposed that the multiplier effects of different components
are not equivalent, as is implicitly assumed in the procedure fol-
lowed.
In purely descriptive terms, and treating autonomous expend-
itures as equivalent in their effects dollar for dollar, it would
appear that a correct judgment concerning total magnitudes in
the fourth quarter of 1945, other things being equal, would have
led to an estimate of $173 billion for gross national product, or
halfway between actual and forecast (see Table 5).Inthe first
quarter of 1946, on the other hand, the effect would have been
negligible, in terms of this gross approach.
It is impossible, however, to apply ceteris paribus to this case so
rigidly. Had we forecast total autonomous expenditures accurately,
presumably the various components would have been closer.
Military demobilization would probably have been correctly fore-
seen, giving a smaller military payroll and larger military transfer
payments. The net effect would have been some increase in the
disposable income associated with a given gross national product
and some additional effect on consumption. It is of course idle to
carry this sort of ex post speculation much further. All the factors
discussed are so complexly interrelated that a complete explana-
tion in terms of separate and neatly identifiable elements is cliffi-
cult.
Government war expenditures fell considerably more sharply
after V-J Day than was expected. (A principal factor was the
Cf.Klein, bc. cit. Klein's dismissal of errors in the autonomous expenditures as
of no real importance is due partly to his failure to include all the items, in par-
ticular the allowance for 'extra' nondurables consumption; partly to changes in
the actual data after he wrote his analysis; partly to his neglect of the possible
significance of the differences in component8, e.g., government war expenditures as
against private capital outlays.292 PART IV
speedier demobilization of the armed forces, involving a deeper
cut in military payrolls which was partly offset by increases in
rates of pay.) The level from which cuts were made was in fact
already lower than that used in the forecasts, according to revised
data for the first half of 1945 (App.Table 1). In addition, the
rate of cut-back was faster on the whole than the official schedules
seemed to call for just prior to V-J Day, and the time pattern was
different. Thus, the fourth quarter of 1945 rate of adjusted war
expenditures had been forecast at $40 billion; it is now estimated
to have been $43billion.The first quarter of 1946 ran to $24 billion
instead of the expected $33 The corresponding differences
in total government expenditures are approximately the same. To
be sure, some of the difference between forecast and actual reflects
price changes from first of 1945 levels. Our price data are,
however, inadequate to permit proper correction and it is safer to
take the actual data at current prices.
Total private capital formation, per contra, was considerably
underestimated for fiscal 1946. As against a forecast of less than $13
billion, actual outlays were almost $20 billion. The first quarter of
1946 rate was over $23 billion in contrast to an expected $13
billion (App. I, Table 5).Agoodly portion of the difference is
accounted for by much heavier private exports (in part due to
favorable prices abroad, in part to heavy foreign demand) than
expected, so that the net export balance, e.g., in the fourth
quarter, wasbillion larger than forecast, in the first quarter of
1946, $2.7 billion larger.'7
Inventory accumulation ran at less than a billion dollars in the
Someitems in the gross national product accounts appear to have been shifted
from war expenditures to exports in the net foreign balance; e.g., shipments of
goods by the War Department for our occupation and civilian personnel abroad are
treated as paid for by the enemy (occupied) country, and are deducted from
government expenditures. There are likewise peculiarities of .both timing and
classification of certain Lend-Lease settlements, as well as continuing obscurities
in the proper treatment of government corporation activities. No significantly
large magnitudes are involved in these debatable points of method and classifica-
tion.
17Thereis no good reason for classifying the export balance as private capital
formation. It is a balancing item in the total accounts for the economy vis-a-vis
the rest of the world, and ought to be shown as such. The revised series on national
income and product recently published by the Department of Commerce haveREVIEW OFECONOMIC FORECASTS 293
fourth quarter instead of the $4 billion predicted. Consumer and
business demand was so brisk, in the face of production bottle-
necks and shortages, that the desire for larger inventory-pile-up
could not be implemented. In the first quarter, however, despite
heavy demand for goods, business firms managed to accumulate
inventory at an estimated annual rate of $3.4 billion; the predic-
tion was $2.0 billion.
Construction, both residential and nonresidential, has run con-
sistently ahead of expectations. In the fourth quarter of 1945 it
was a little less than a billion dollars higher; in 1946—first quarter
—it was $3 billion higher (at an annual rate) than Hagen forecast.
About one-fourth of the difference is attributable to price in-
creases, the rest to physical volume. What this means is that build-
ing materials—lumber, brick, cement, plumbing supplies, etc.—
have been available faster than forecast, although still in acutely
short supply relative to demand. Similarly, the flow of producers'
capital equipment has been faster than we had thought possible,
running about billion higher on the average in fiscal 1946.
Thus, business investment in plant and equipment was rather
considerably heavier than expected. Does this mean that it was
in fact behaving as an exogenous factor, but that supplies were
simply larger than hoped for? Or does it mean that business men,
reacting to rising prices and a heavy backlog of orders supporting
heavy current sales, expected a prolongation of the boom and helped
•to realize it by stepping up their demand for investment goods?
We shall return to this query.
• The forecast magnitudes of consumer expenditures for durable
goods and rents were almost precisely correct if price changes are
disregarded. Since prices, especially of major durables such as cars
and refrigerators, have risen, the rate of real consumption (or
better, purchases) was smaller than expected. The disappointing
output of passenger cars and a few other major durables accounts
for this difference.
The portion of nondurable goods consumption—the special
demand for clothing and household goods coming chiefly from
made this change among many others (National Income, Supplement to Survey of
Current Business, July 1947).294 PART IV
demobilized veterans and their families—treated in the forecasts
as autonomous has unquestionably been higher than assumed.
Had demobilization been correctly forecast, more allowance would
have been made in nondurable goods expenditures for such special
demands over and above the prewar 'normal' relation between
nondurable goods and disposable income. Instead of $2.0 billion
per quarter at an annual rate it would have been nearer $3.0
billion. This effect has also been taken into account in Table 5.
So much for the descriptive facts Sand for the gross over-all
effect of errors in autonomous expenditures. Let us now raise spe-
cifically the question about thecomposition of autonomous items,
about illogical or unreasonable classification of some, about pos-
sibly different multiplier effects rather than equal effects.
A2Misclassification of autonomous items
As we have noted, government expenditures on the whole fell more
than expected, while private capital formation rose more. Is the
multiplier effect on income and employment of a dollar outlay of
private investment greater than the corresponding effect of a
dollar of government expenditure? For example, plant and equip-
ment outlays involve the whole economy—heavy goods manu-
facturing, construction, the distributive trades, transportation,
etc.—and the income-generating and employment-supporting
effects of such expenditures are considerable. In contrast, items
such as civilian and military government payroll, or interest on
the public debt—the latter paid largely to banks, corporations,
and high income individuals—are not likely to have such sub-
stantial effects on income and employment, and the 'leakages' out
of interest income into savings are substantial. Such items make
up a large part of government expenditures on goods and services
as defined and measured by the Department of Cornmerce.18
18Thereis indeed considerable economic logic behind the view that interest
payments on the public debt ought to be considered as a pure transfer item rather
than an item of final product. This has consistently been the British treatment;
it has been adopted in the recent complete revisions by the Department of Com-
merce of their gross national product—national income series (Survey of Current
Business, Supplement, July 1947). One wonders whether from the same viewpoint
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Thereis no way at present to measure or infer the possible quanti-
tative significance of the differences in effects suggested; one must
fall back on the general plausibility of the point.
Furthermore, was it correct to classify private capital outlays—
plant, equipment, and net changes in inventories—as autonomous
during the transition period? For normal periods economists agree
that investment is some complex function of general business
activity—past, current, and expected—and that there is mutual
interaction and interrelation between investment and other eco-
nomic sectors. For the short-run transition period after the war it
seemed plausible to many economists to think of capital expend-
itures at least as effectively independent of current or recent levels
of business. That is, it was felt that supply factors would be deter-
mining since demand far exceeded any conceivable rate of avail-
able supply. In addition, even demand was apparently thought to
be autonomous at least as far as it was based on accumulated needs
for capital replacement (deferred maintenance, etc.) and on mini-
mum requirements for expansion of facilities for peacetime pro-
duction.
The question is whether the realization during the early tran-
sition months of higher levels of national economic activity, and
of sales and profits, than perhaps business men expected, has not
led to upward revisions of capital expansion and replacement
plans. Has a climate of expectations highly favorable to invest-
ment been created, within which investment in substantial mea-
sure has been acting as a derived and related, rather than as an
exogenous magnitude?
In some measure Hagen did, as already noted, consider the
interaction and repercussion effects between investment, total
output, and employment. Main reliance on what might be ex-
pected in the way of capital outlays by the chief industry sectors
of American business was placed in the results of a survey of
business intentions to invest in plant and equipment, and inven-
The services performed are after all of a clearly immeasurable and transcendental
•nature; it might be preferable in such cases to attempt no valuation along market
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tory, during roughly the year:following V-E In broad terms
the survey showed that manufacturing industry planned to spend
$4.5billionon plant, equipment, and major alterations, far above
prewar levels, even allowing for higher prices of investment goods;
railways and covered public utilities planned similar capital out-
lays of about $1.5 billion, well above immediate prewar levels, but
not as high as 1929. Capital outlays in these industries comprised
less than half the total for the economy in prewar years—the other
portion was accounted for by communication and the remaining
transportation industries, miscellaneous other public utilities,
trade, service and finance industries, and farmers. As the survey
offered no clue regarding investment intentions it was necessary
to guess possible maximum outlays for these industries.
The Department of Commerce survey leaves several points
obscure. It is not clear whether reporting firms were suggesting
their maximum or a sort of 'optimum' demand for capital outlays,
or some portion of that demand representing minimum essential
needs, or giving their notions of what they could reasonably ex-
pect to spend in the tight supply situation for construction mate-
rials, labor, and various kinds of equipment. Secondly, it is not
wholly clear whether the intentions to spend covered only new
constructIon and equipment or might cover also used plant, chiefly
government surplus items. The forecasters assumed, in using the
survey results as a guide to probable outer limits of expenditure
for plant and equipment, that a considerable amount would be
purchases of government surplus property, and would not reflect
current production. Capital expenditure has expanded much more
than expected and has been much more completely new capital
Thesurvey covered manufacturing, railroads, and electric and gas utilities—
with a sample of nearly 7,000 firms in manufacturing, and coverage of abDut 90
percent of all activity in the other three industry groups. Firms were requested to
give information on planned outlays for new construction and equipment, main-
tenance and repairs, and increased inventory and on how they expected to finance
these investments, and to state what levels of sales they expected during the first
postwar year since "it was considered that capital expenditures for the years after
V-E Day would be geared to sales expectations for the period shortly beyond that
date". For a full discussion of this survey and analysis of its results see the articles
by 0. S. Wilson on 'Planned Capital Outlays and Financing', Survey of Current
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formation sincegovernmentsurplus sales have moved slowly on
the whole. The survey also failed to reveal plans and expenditures
that were thought of as effectively independent of sales, profits,
or other measures of economic conditioiis, as against those which
were considered contingent and variable. There is some connection
between this point and the one made above, since some outlays
represent essential needs that cannot be postponed, for which firm
commitments have been made, etc.2°
It seems rather a distinct possibility that business firms did
more consciously relate investment plans and decisions during the
transition to current and prospective levels of sales, profits, etc.
than most economic forecasters allowed for. Even more, as will be
suggested, business men's expectations about the economic climate
were much more optimistic than those of the Washington econo-
mists whose views commanded most attention; and actual devel-
opments may constantly have exceeded even those expectations,
thus leading to further upward revisions of investment plans.
This statement is borne out not only by plant and equipment
expenditures but also by the sustained and general inventory
boom we have been experiencing. Although explanation of the
boom chiefly in terms of inventory accumulation is clearly inade-
quate, certainly the need for restocking of goods—reffihing of pipe-
lines—for civilian production has been a substantial factor in.
sustaining employment and has betokened a definitely optimistic
feeling about the immediate future.
A3Relation of disposable income to gross national product
A considerable part of the explanation of what went wrong with
so many of the prominent Washington forecasts lies in their under-
20Thissort of problem lies at the center of further exploratory work required to
clarify the nature and operations of the investment function in our economy.
The quarterly surveys of business plant and equipment outlays now being con-
ducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Com-
merce obtaininformation on expected expenditures for two quarters ahead. There
is real need to tie these data in with the kind of general economic climate the
reporting firms expect, and to segregate, even roughly, expenditures that are
really 'autonomous' and those considered to be likely or desirable depending on
circumstances. Dynamic analysis, utilizing expectations and intentions data, is
only in its infancy and can hope for many new clues and tools from such surveys.298 PART IV
estimate of the disposable income in the hands of consumers for
any given level of gross national product. At levels of gross na-
tional product around $185 billion, the relation used by Hagen,
for example, put disposable income in the fourth quarter of 1945
$7 billion below what it actually was. In the first quarter of 1946
the error was more like $9—bbillion (Chart 3).
The forecasters' procedure was predicated necessarily upon spe-
cific assumptions concerning crucial policies affecting the levels of
money incomes available for spending by consumers and business.
The ratio of wages and salaries to gross national product is influ-
enced by wage-rate policy in conjunction with price policy. In the
forecasts it was assumed that the structure of wage-price control
in effect on V-J Day would not be revised substantially. In fact,
prices and wages rose considerably; and aggregate wages reached
a level above the normal wartime relation with gross national
product.
Farm entrepreneurial income likewise rose, absolutely and rela-
tively, in the face of a declining gross national product. This too
was due in part to a softening of price controls over farm products,
and to a change in public policy.
Thirdly, an estimate of disposable income hinges in part upon
assumptions about tax-rate policy and structure. The forecasts
did take into account probable reductions in tax rates, both cor-
porate and personal, at the beginning of 1946 (see App. II). Busi-
ness and Congressional sentiment even before V-J Day made it
clear that a substantial dismantling of the wartime tax structure
was inevitable. The tax policy put into effect, however, was con-
siderably softer than any of us expected or recommended. Conse-
quently taxes have taken a smaller bite out of income produced
and distributed.
Fourthly, transfer payments have been much higher than was
expected. The far lower unemployment benefits have been more
than offset by larger• payments to veterans. In part this is due to
theadoption by Congress of more liberal benefits to GI's, in part
to faster demobilization. Military transfer payments per man have
been higher than military pay per man so that the net effect onREVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 299
income payments of speedier demobilization has been upward
demobilization proceeded.
Not all the elements explaining the higher level of income are
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charges to depreciation and other business reserves appear to have
been lower than expected for a given level of gross national prod-
uct; corporations have adopted a slightly more liberal dividend
policy so that corporate savings are a smaller proportion of profits.
The net effec.t of these and other factors was to give a level of
disposable income perhaps $7—bbillion higher for a given gross
national product than expected. This difference, had it been cor-
rectly gauged, would have changed substantially all the forecasts
of gross national product, consumption, employment, and unem-
ployment. The estimation of the 'correct' functional relation
operating in 1945—46 between disposable income and gross national
product is necessarily very rough (despite one actual observed
point and knowledge of policies in effect). However, a crude
approximation, sufficient for present purposes, has been developed
by the writer in order to suggest the relative importance of this
error. Using the correct functions in the model system employed
by the forecasters, and holding other factors constant, the system
yields a solution for gross national product in the fourth quarter of
1945 of $171 billion instead of the forecast $165 billion (Table 5).21
Since actual, gross national product in current prices was $185
billion, roughly 30 percent of the difference would have been
accounted for. Consumer expenditures likewise would have been
estimated about $5 billion higher. Employment, estimated upon
the same assumptions as were in fact made, would have been fore-
cast roughly 1.5 million higher and the unemployment estimate
would have been lower by the same amount.
For the first quarter of 1946 the effect of this disposable income
factor is even greater, chiefly because of the larger tax reductions
than expected. Use of the correct function for income would,
ceteris paribus, have led to an estimate of gross national product
$10 billion higher than that forecast, accounting for about half of
21 A correct appraisal and forecast of the disposable income-gross national product
function would necessarily have involved different forecasts of other elements,
so that the condition of ceteris pan bus cannot be strictly adhered to,even theore-
tically. For example, the estimate of autonomous factors would have been altered
too, since, owing to faster demobilization, government war expenditures would
have been set lower (reduced military payroll.)—incidently offsetting some of the
effect on the forecasts otherwise attributable to use of the correct disposable in-
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the difference from the actual figure of $184 billion in current
prices. The employment estimate would have been correspond-
ingly increased about 3 million, and unemployment would have
been lower by the same amount. The effects would have been sub-
stantial.
TABLE5
Effect of Alternative Assumptions on Forecasts








Actual data 185.2 136.9 113.0
Forecast 164.6 119.9 96.2
Effects on forecasts if (cet. par.)
1Autonomousexpenditurea had been correctly 173 124 100
forecast
2Disposableincome had been correctly 171 128 101
forecast
3Totalconsuniptionfunction° had been used 177 126 109
First Quarter 1946
Actual data 183.7 138.1 121.0
Forecast 161.8 120.9 99.5
Effects onforeca.sts if (cet. par.)
1Autonomousexpendituresa had been correctly167 123 103
forecast
2Dieposable income functionb had been correctly 172 135 108
forecast
3Totalconsumption functionb had been used 170 125 108
Actual data from Department of Commerce.
Including an assumed excess of nondurables expenditure over the normal rela-
tionship.
bUsinga crude approximation to the actual relation between disposable income
and gross national product in each period (see Chart 3).
Relationship fitted to data for 1929, 1933, and 1935—40, giving: consumer ex-
penditures =6.80+ .05 time + .806 disposable income (where time =givenyear
—1935).
Clearly,much of the error involved in the income-gross national
product relation is attributable to wrong guesses or judgments
about policy changes, in part to deliberate avoidance of attempts
to guess the probable course of, e.g., stabilization policy. Are the
forecasters to be taken to task for this? Or is it sufficient excuse
that they at least• explicitly set forth the policy assumptions on




ing and as a basis for improving future work it is well to know
where error is due to faulty judgment or assumption and where
to faulty statistical technique or economic reasoning.
A4 Use of component rather than total consumption function
Allora large part of the forecast errOr may be attributed to the
choice of the wrong functional relation between consumption and
disposable income (and possibly other variables). That is, econo-
mists may have selected an essentially incorrect theory of con-
sumer behavior, at least for the period in question. This view,
suggested by many, and subscribed to bywriter as a plausible
partial explanation, has forcibly been put forward recently by
Klein.22 The view is essentially as follows: Since individuals ordi-
narily decide how much of a given income they will spend and
save respectively, the community, an aggregate of individuals,
does also.23 Once having decided what to spend, the individual or
community allocates spendings in various proportions, among the
various types or categories of goods and services (the 'grossest'
categories being the tri-partite division into durables, nondurables,
and services). The commodity pattern of consumption is presum-
ably determined, within the total spendings budget, by many
factors: habitual living standards, complementarity relationships
among items, relative prices, etc.
The Washington 'model builders' elected a somewhat different
theory and approach, based on the wartime behavior Of consumer
expenditures. In the prewar period there had been an apparently
quite close simple linear relation between disposable income (or
disposable income and time) on the one hand, and consumer
expenditures for durables, nondurables, and services, respectively,
on the other. During the war, with shortages or the elimination of
major durables such as automobiles, and shortages of many serv-
ices (e.g., domestic service), consumption for these two categories
22'APost-Mortem on Transition Predictions of National Product', Journal of
Political Economy, LIV, 3, August 1946, especially pp. 298—9.
23Cf.Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Harcourt,
Brace, 1935), especially Chapters Sand 9. Keynes of course measures his consump-
tion and income concepts in terms of real wage units; also, he allows for various
qualitative and psychological determinants of consumption .in addition to the
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fell in greater or lesser degree below the 'normal' relation (Chart
4 and App. Table 7). Despite this fact, and in apparent contra-
diction to the simple Keynesian hypothesis about total consump-
tion and income, the expenditures for nondurable goods in the war
years stayed amazingly close to the simple regression line based on
19.29—40 experience.24 Instead of 'spilling-over' into nondurable
expenditures, the money not spent on durables and services flowed
into savings, swelling the community's holdings of liquid assets
such as currency, bank deposits, and federal government secu-
rities.
Many economists in Washington reasoned that nondurable
expenditures would continue to vary closely with income, and
essentially in accordance with the prewar function. However, in
view of the special intense demands of veterans and their families
for clothing, household textiles, and the like, some small deviation
above billion—was allowed for. Expenditures for
services (aside from rents) were estimated to rise toward the nor-
mal relation as supply conditions eased. Outlays on durable goods
of course were expected to remain far below the normal relation
to income, and to rise only as fast as increasing production per-
mitted. Rents likewise were expected to rise very slowly, given
continued rent controls and the almost complete inelasticity of
supply of dwelling units in the short run. Total consumption .was
the sum of these four components.
Should we have used the prewar total consumption function and
raised our estimates of consumer expenditures, gross national
product, and employment? Does it give us an essentially correct
interpretation of consumer behavior, from which the war years
represent a peculiar and temporary aberration? There is consider-
able warrant, of course, in both theory and experience, for thinking
that consumers first determine the proportions of income spent
and saved, then allocate spendings among various categories.
Nevertheless, as can be seen easily on Chart 4, from 1941 to the first half of 1945
nondurable expenditures also were depressed, on the average 5 percent below the
regression line. There were shortages of some nondurables as well as of durables,
e.g.,. meat and butter, clothing, gasoline. Likewise, price control operated quite
effectively as a damper, even after allowances for hidden price increases, upgrad-

























































Relation between Consumer Expenditures and Disposable Income
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The fitted line represents the net relation between consumer
expenditures and disposable income, with time held con—
stant at zero, in the total regression equation.
Consumer Expenditures
6.80 + .05 Time + .806 Disposableincome
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The fitted line represents the net relation between consumer
expenditures for durable goods and disposable income, with
time held constant at zero, in the regression equation:
Consumer Expenditures for Durables
—3.50— .O59Time +.150 Disposable Income
(Time = given year minus f935)










































The fitted line represents the net relation between consumer
expenditures for nondurable goods and disposable income,
with time held constant at zero, in the regression equation:
Consumer Expenditures for Nondurables / 3.51 + .095 Time + .427 Disposable Income
(TLme = given year minus 1935) •33
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The fitted line represents the net relation between consumer
expenditures for services and disposable income, with time
held constant at zero, in the regression equation:
Consumer Expenditures for Services
6.79 + .014 Time + .229 Disposable Income
(Timegiven year minus 1935)
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Certainly application of this approach would have vastly improved
the forecasts. For example, had the total consumption function
been used in the model system, and other assumptions and rela-
tionships held constant, the estimate for gross national product in
the 1945 fourth quarter would have been $177 billion (the forecast
was $165 billion and the actual $185 billion), accounting for 60
percent of the error in the forecast, and presenting a more 'effi-
cient' hypothesis than that based on the autonomous expenditures
or on the error in the disposable income function (Table 5). Of the
total error, $17 billion, in the, forecast for consumer expenditures,
$13 billion or 75 percent would have been accounted for by this ap-
proach. For the first quarter of 1946 this consumption hypothesis
is almost as good an explanation of the errors as the disposable
income factor. It would have accounted for $8 billion of the gross
national product discrepancy and $8 billion of the error in con-
sumption (35—40 percent of the total error).
Clearly an error of this sort in the choice of an appropriate
theory of consumer behavior and an appropriate consumption
function is not in itself a sufficient total explanation. Other kinds
of errors of assumption contributed to the forecasting errors, as
has been demonstrated.25 But the evidence that this theory of
consumption behavior is the correct or at least most plausible,
and that the total consumption function more nearly correctly
fits actual experience during the transition period should be re-
viewed.
The underlying theory has the force of simplicity, considerable
logic, and apparent consistency with prewar experience. (There
is much greater theoretical justification, however, for considering
that real consumption and real income are functionally related,
as Keynes assumes, than that the money flows in current prices
give the proper relationship.) Theory calls for other possible vari-
ables than current income in explaining the total variation in con-
sumption—preceding year's income, rate of change in income,
changes in the price level, interest rate, holdings of liquid assets,
etc. However, most empirical studies suggest that these variables
25Klein,Journal of Political Economy, LIV,3, p.298, is too sweeping in his claim
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do not add much to the statistical explanation of consumption,
at least for 1929-40.
Important too is the question of just what type of function fitted
to which period most accurately represents the true normal rela-
tion between aggregate consumer expenditures, disposable income,
and other significant variables.26 Most of the functions used by the
Washington forecasters were of the simplest variety, relating con-
sumption with income alone, either in 'real' or current dollars, or
adding a time trend term. In general they were fitted only to
1929—40, chiefly on the statistical ground that adequate and con-
sistent series are not available earlier. It is generally conceded that
a longer period is necessary to represent properly the long-run
consumption function, to separate secular from cyclical influences,
Nevertheless, the differences in the forecasts due to using
other total consumption functions would certainly have been fairly
small and unimportant in comparison with the difference between
using any total function and a battery of partial or component con-
sumption functions.
In apparent support of the contention that consumers behaved
after V-J Day in accordance with the simple aggregate consump-
tion function used in the Washington models is the statistical
record of consumption. According to recent Department of Com-
merce estimates, total consumer expenditures in the fourth quarter
of 1945 were only 4 percent below the calculated function value at
26Ourrecent experience certainly emphasizes that the analysis of the basic de-
terminants of consumption over time is still in its infancy, and that much more
methodological and exploratory work is necessary. The literature on the subject
is already voluminous. Of recent materials only a few are cited here: Arthur
Smithies, J. L. Mosak, and Morris Livingstone, 'Forecasting Postwar Demand',
Econometrica, Jan. 1945; W. S. Woytinsky, 'Relationship Between Consumers'
Expenditures, Savings, and Disposable Income', Review of Economic Statistics,
Feb. 1946; also in the same journal, V. Lewis Bassie, 'Consumers' Expenditures in
War and Transition', Aug. 1946; Irwin Friend, 'Relationship between Consumers'
Expenditures, Savings, and Disposable Income', and L. H. Bean, 'Relation of
Disposable Income and the Business Cycle to° Expenditures', both in the Nov.
1946 issue. See also T. Haavelmo, 'Methods of Measuring the Marginal Propensity
to Consume', Journal of the American Statistical Association, March 1947; Louis
Paradiso, 'Retail Sales and Consumer Incomes', Survey of Current Business, Oct.
1944. See also Part V of this volume.
This view has been fully and forcefully developed, for example, by Modigliani.308 PART IV
the actual disposable income. In both the first and second quarters
of 1946 the observed data were practically on the regression line
(see Table 6 and Chart 4). As tentative third quarter figures
further reinforce the hypothesis, there is about one full year of post
V-J experience suggesting the active operation of the total con-
sumption function. Does this prove the hypothesis we are dis-
cussing? Or are other explanations equally cogent? Is the close
correspondence between observed and calculated values for con-
sumption systematic or fortuitous? What will tend to happen from
now on as supplies of durable goods become more plentiful: will
total consumption rise above the prewar function or will It remain
on or close to it, and will nondurable expenditures recede as dur-
ables and services rise toward 'normal'?28 What would nondurable
outlay have been if durables had been produced in larger amounts?
TABLE6
Estimatesof Consumer Expenditures at Actual Disposable Income
Third Quarter 1945toSecond Quarter 1946




























Actual data from Department of Commerce.
aTotalconsumption =6.80+ .05 time + .806 disposable income (time =given
year —1935).Fitted to the data for 1929, 1933, and 1935—40.
bExpendituresfor durables, rent and part of the excess of nondurable consump-
tion treated as autonomous. Nondurable expenditures estimated from relation to
disposable income and time. The estimates for services (excluding rent) are the
relationshipvalues arbitrarily lowered in the same proportions applied in the
original forecasts to allow for deficiencies on the supply side.
It is the phenomenal and quite unexpected rise in nondurable
expenditures since the that has been most striking. In the
fourth quarter of 1945 these expenditures ran $7.6 billion above
28Thespread appears to be increasing, for figures for the fourth quarter of 1946
(&irveyof Current Business, Feb. 1947) show total consumption running $5 billion
(at an annual rate)above the calculated value. Furthermore, nondurables con-
tinue to rise sharply and are more rather than less above the function value.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 309
the relationship value and in the first quarter of 1946, $11.6 billion,
or 18 percent, above. Their trend increase since the war has been
very sharp (see Chart 4). It appears that consumer income, which
could not find customary outlets in durable goods during the first
postwar year, has 'spilled over' into the nondurable goods areas,
in which supplies have been more abundant, prices possibly rela-
tively favorable, etc.29
Why did this spill-over effect fail to appear during the war?
Why did the prewar total spending-saving relation cease to oper-
ate? During 1942-45 the ratio of savings to disposable income rose
at times to as high as 30 percent; the normal range is 10-15 per-
cent. Several factors were contributory: significant shortages in
many nondurable goods—clothing and household textiles, gaso-
line, and many others; price and rationing controls that were effec-
tive far beyond expectations and bad a great deal to do with damp-
ening consumption; a powerful, sustained, positive national
campaign to encourage savings, particularly in the form of govern-
ment war bonds. Although, as noted earlier, nondurable expendi-
tures stayed near the 'normal' regression line, they fell somewhat
below it. There seem in any case to be both logical and psycho-
logical reasons why they did not rise above it. An individual
can consume only so much food, etc. Even allowing for a tendency
to shift to higher-priced (and perhaps higher-quality) goods when
income rises, there is still a saturation point. Price controls and
rationing would brake increases in money expenditures further.
Quality deterioration, less variety of choice, etc. all tended to
20Toexplain the heavy shift of demand to nondurables, Klein, Journal of Poli-
tical Economy, LIV, 3, advances as an additional hypothesis the argument that
prices of nondurables have in fact been significantly lower relatively than prices
of durables (meaning of course maj or durables). The prices of unavailable durables
are of course effectively infinite! However, the writer is inclined to doubt the
quantitative significance of this factor in explaining consumption behavior,
even if price relationships have been as alleged. The practical point is that no
matter how low the prices of durables might have been, actual expenditures could
not have been larger, for there was no more to be bought. That is, prices must be
considered in relation to the urgency and extent of demand—in the case of major
durables, for which accumulated deferred demand is large, total demand for some
• time to come will probably far exceed any conceivable supply at any price. For
normal periods, of course, the relative price factor may be more significant in
determining the level and pattern of consumption.310 . PARTIV
dampen consumer enthusiasm for frittering away wartime earn-
ings. On the more positive side, many thousands of families found
it possible for the first time to save substantial amounts system-
atically; payroll deductions for war bonds, in particular, were a
convenient means. Scarcity of major durable goods meant post-
ponement of purchases and the earmarking of savings. Shoddy
clothing, beyond minimum current requirements, and more expen-
sive restaurant meals are not attractive competitors of the shiny
new cars and refrigerators, the dream-houses, etc. promised for
the postwar world.
Why then did this restraint seem to evaporate so swiftly and
completely at the end of the war? Houses, cars, and durable goods
were• still unavailable; why did consumers 'boil over' in impa-
tience? The fact that it was no longer patriotic to skimp and be
shabby may be part of the answer. Several additional factors,
•however, also bound up with the aftermath-of-war psychology,
contribute to an explanation. It is these factors, discussed below,
that make the analysis based simply upon the restoration to full
effectiveness of a prewar 'normal' total consumption function seem
a little too pat, too mechanical.
It is perhaps idle to speculate whether, if durables had been
available in we would have experienced the non-
durable goods spending spree. Would total expenditures have
considerably exceeded the total relationship value, or would they
have been about the same, and the allocation among categories
been different? Some of the lines of the hypothesis suggested below
tend to support the feeling that a large part of the nondurables
splurge would have occurred in any case, and that total expendi-
tures would have been considerably higher than have been.
One wisp of suggestive evidence: data for the third quarter of 1946
show that while the annual rate of durable goods outlay went up
from $13 billion to $15 billion, a rise of 14 percent over the second
quarter, nondurables outlay rose from $74 billion to $78 billion.
Moreover, this put nondurables outlay 15 percent above the ex-
pected relationship value—a greater relative excess than in any
period except the first quarter of 1946. In the fourth quarter of
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•nondurables rose $3.5 billion to a total of nearly $82 billion, or 17
•percent above the normal relation.
The apparent wartime behavior of nondurable expenditures was
misleading in another sense. Reliance on the money relationship
•with income tended to obscure the extent to which physical con-
sumption was declining owing to shortages, and real satisfactions
diminishing owing to quality deterioration, upgrading of mer-
chandise, etc. Had the analysis been in real terms, however crude
the deflators, the actual decline of consumption below 'normal'
would have been more apparent. As a result of wartime unavail-
ability or shoddiness of many nondurables, consumer inventories
of clothing, household textiles, etc. have been considerably de-
pleted. There has, undoubtedly been a substantial accumulation
of deferred replacement needs and demands, not alone for veterans
but for the civilian population in general. Closely related is the
•unusual spurt in marriages and births. Retrospectively, some
special allowance for the effect of this accelerated rate of family
formation on postwar consumption seems to have been called for;
only in part was it taken care of by the modest allowances for
excess nondurables consumption in the projections by Hagen and
others.3°
Another question has to do with the possible nonlinearity of the
consumption function at the high levels of income prevailing in
recent years, far above prewar, on which our relationships are
'based. The hypothesis of linearity is the simplest and seemed to
work in the past but we have little 'normal' experience with sus-
tained high-level income and consumption by which to test alter-
native hypotheses, although there is some theoretical reason for
•expecting the function to become concave downward.31 If the 'true'
•function is of this character, actual consumption has been above
its expected value.
In summary, the view that a large part of the forecasters' error
,lay in using component rather than total consumption relation-
"Cf.V. Lewis BassIe, bc. cit.
81Thismay depend in part on what happens to the relative size distribution of
income as income rises and the effect of changes in the distribution on consump-
tion. At present these points are among the most obscure in the analysis of con-
sumption.PART IV
ships remains highly plausible. The evidence supporting it is rather
strong, though still circumstantial and possibly fortuitous. In any
event it is not in itself a sufficient explanation of the entire error,
as was noted. However, several other factors help to explain the
behavior of consumption during the transition period.
A5 Accumulated liquid asset holdings
The possible influence of cash balances on changes in the level of
consumption has been discussed at length recently. Although it
adds something to the explanation of consumption trends, the size
of personal cash or liquid asset holdings before the war was too
small, even relative to income levels, to make much difference.
During the war, holdings of cash and war bonds by individuals
rose enormously, relative to both prewar holdings and wartime
incomes. The possibility that they might appreciably affect the
level of postwar consumption must be considered, but unfor-
tunately cannot be tested adequately as yet.32
The most concrete and suggestive evidence is that offered by
the National Survey of Liquid This study tends to sup-
82Themost extreme views on these possible effects have been advanced especially,
by W. S. Woytinsky, 'Postwar Economic Perspectives', Part IV, Social Security
Butletin, March 1946. For further discussion see the articles in the Proceedings of
the American Economic Association, May 1945, especially one by J. J. O'Leary,
'Consumption as a Factor in Postwar Employment'. As early as mid-1943 E. T.
Weiler also cautiously suggested the danger under certain conditions of a postwar
inflation attributable to accumulated liquid savings. Cf. 'Wartime Savings and
Postwar Inflation', Survey of Current Business, July 1943. Also see Gardiner C.
Means in the American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1946;
V. Lewis Bassie, toe. cit.
This study, conducted for the Federal Reserve Board by the Bureau of Agricul-
tural Economics, was based on a national sample of about 3,000 households.
Families were interviewed early in 1946 concerning their holdings of liquid assets
(defined as demand and time dep6sits, and United States savings bonds); total
income and total net savings in 1945; and their intentions to spend or otherwise
use their liquid assets during 1946 or beyond for durable goods, housing, and other
items. The results of this survey are extremely interesting but at many crucial
points inconclusive. They bring out an expected high concentration of liquid
asset holdings among families; e.g., 60 percent of the total assets held by the top 10
percent of spending units classified by sire of assets, involving total holdings of
$3,400 or more; however, when classification is by 1945 incomes, 36 percent of total
liquid assets are held by the top 8 percent of income recipients, or those with
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port the idea that on the whole families did not intend and did not
want to spend their liquid assets in 1946 on such things as auto-
mobiles, refrigerators, and consumer goods generally. Apparently
people preferred if possible to buy out of income, or perhaps bor-
row on short-term (by means of installment credit).
To conclude that the study fails to indicate any tendency for
accumulated liquid savings to support abnormal spending and
contribute an inflationary effect would be hazardous. In the first
place the results of the sample survey when 'blown-up' fail to
account for large amounts of aggregate bank deposits known to
be in the hands of individuals, although the check with national
totals of United States savings bonds is much closer. The survey
omits also holdings of cash, the circulation of which has been enor-
mously expanded. To assume that considerable portions of these
omitted amounts may be held by middle and low income groups
is reasonable. Further, liquid assets designated as possibly 'hot
money' for 1946 in consumer durable goods markets amount to
perhaps $10 billion, certainly not an inconsequential potential
addition to spending from current income. Finally, and most
important, the survey failed to put intentions and attitudinal
questions in the most significant form: to wit, the possible effect
of liquid asset holdings on decisions to spend or save (including
going into debt) from current income, i.e., the effect on the total
propensity to consume function. The survey did tend to show that
people at a given level of income did not expect to save as much in
1946 as they had in 1945. But whether this might mean a signifi-
cantly lower saving-income ratio than before the war is not re-
vealed.
We must therefore still leave some things to inference. Cer-
tainly there is reason for doubting the firmness of intentions to
buy or not. How will people react when they actually see the new
$1,000) accounted for 7 percent of holdings. The concentration of current savings
(out of 1945 incomes) is somewhat greater, as might be expected. Description of
the methods and results of the survey and considerable analysis of the findings
are contained in several reports; see the three BAE reports, National Survey of
Liquid Asset Holdings, Spending and Saving, released June-August 1946; and three
articles on 'A National Survey of Liquid Federal Reserve Bulletin, June,
JuJy, and Aug. 1946.314 PART IV
automobiles, etc., or when they see their neighbors with them?
How will higher prices—coupled perhaps with expectations of
further rises—affect On the whole, the more dispersed
the holdings and the smaller the average amounts held, the greater
the likelihood they may be spent in a diffused and unplanned way,
since the incentive to plan or to accumulate further is less likely
to be strong. The aggregate amounts of liquid assets held by low
or medium income families are not inconsequentialeven though.
a small fraction of total holdings—and their rather wide dispersion
in small average amounts, tends to make them a volatile factor
in consumer goods and, housing That liquid asset hold-
ings have been operating since V-J Day to induce abnormally
heavy consumer expenditures (chiefly for nondurable goods and
some services), is certainly a possible and even strong hypothesis.
A6Other economic factors
As noted earlier, the projections under discussion were couched
in terms of real output, valued at first half of 1945 prices (in some
models 1944 prices). The specific assumption was that price and
wage control policies in effect on V-J Day would remain substan-
tially unaltered, It was expected (implicitly) that prices would not
change or would change so little and so gently as to affect the
course of economic development insignificantly. Have prices and
price expectations not been playing a much more active and posi-
tive role in the transition period?
Despite strong Administration pleas for the continued need of
stabilization controls—supported in part at least by some ele-
ments of labor and business—several programs were rapidly
abandoned or weakened after V-J Day. Furthermore, there was a
rather steady pressure by lobbyists, in the press, etc. for the elim-
ination of all price controls, for drastic cuts in taxes (especially
corporate taxes), for the abolition of materials production and
distribution controls by the Civilian Production Administration,
etc. A climate of expectations looking to much freer markets was
The Survey of Liquid Assets tended to suggest that if prices rose in 1946, people
would spend more and save less rather than lower their standard of living Or
abandon their plans for improving it through increased purchase of durables, etc.
See Relation of Saving and Holdings to Income (BAE, July 1946), Part Two, p. 14.REVIEW
implanted in business; to the public, price inflation seemed likely."
Between V-J Day and the end of 1945 numerous controls were
relaxed, several subsidy programs were dropped, a large number of
•items minor to the cost of living index were decontrolled, a con-
siderable number of wage increases granted under a liberalized
wage-price policy were reflected in upward adjustments of price
ceilings, etc. Nevertheless, prices did not move strongly upward
•at first: by the end of 1945 the cost of living index was .5 percent
above the August 15 level; the wholesale price index was up 1 per-
cent; the index of prices received by farmers was up 1.5 percent.37
By June 1946, however, these indicators stood 3, 7, and 7 percent
respectively above their positions on V-J Day.
The rising trend of prices has been enough to support a con-
siderable speculative fever—apparent in the scramble for inven-
tories, in the housing and building materials fields, and in other
commodities markets. It has been reflected in the behavior of the
stock market since V-J Day (Chart 5). Given the kind of postwar
consumer psychology that seems to have been prevalent, and the
large volume of pent-up demand for goods and services, the price
increases we have had, together with expectations of further rises,
have probably led to increased rather than decreased real con-
sumer demand for goods in general. (Evidences of 'buyer strikes'
for specific commodities, e.g., meat or butter, are likely to be
dangerously misleading.)
It is thus likely that rising prices have contributed actively to
both investment and consumption demand during the transition,
creating a buoyancy that helped sustain employment and income
through the reconversion period.
The physical process of reconversion itself has also been faster
on the whole than was thought possible in August 1945. Well under
way in 1944, it probably went further than WPB rules sanc-
tioned.38 Moreover, justbusiness—for its own purposes—
President'sExecutive Order 9599, looking to the earliest possible removal of
wartime controls without endangering economic stability, probably contributed
to this state of mind.
"Thehandiest compendium of post V-J Day price, wage, and other stabilization
developments is to be found in the Quarterly Reports issued by OPA and OWMR.
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tended to play up the problems of conversion to war, so it prob-
ably 'over-sold' on problems of reconversion. Expectations of
excess profits tax removal early in 1946 also tended to favor piling
up reconversion costs as much as possible in late 1945. Conse-
quently, employment and wages were unexpectedly well-sustained,
especially relative to current production and sales, by converting
industries; and supplies of goods, despite disappointments and
set-backs (as e.g., in the case of automobiles), in general were more
quickly available than was implicitly assumed in the projections.
Although the factors discussed above have undoubtedly con-
tributed to the postwar boom, they seem to the writer relatively
minor facets of the explanation. A more important line of analysis
is the kind of socio-psychological climate that has prevailed since
the war, particularly its effects on consumption.
B POSTWAR SOCIAL ANDPSYCHOLOGICALFACTORS
It may be argued—quite seriously—that the explanation of post
V-J Day consumption behavior lies essentially in the socio-psycho-
logical realm rather than in any systematic economic or statistical
analysis. Perhaps the relative youth of the forecasters made them
insufficiently aware of and unimpressed by the lessons of after-
maths of other wars; economists of an older vintage tended to do
better because they relied more on history.
Release from wartime tensions and repressions, the desire to cut
loose, to spend and enjoy, is a favorite 'popular' Its pop-
ularity does not make it any the less important from a scientific
viewpoint, even though its terms of reference are somewhat vague,
its concepts 'fuzzy', and evidence in support of it indefinite or at
least nonquantitative.
What are the tangible elements of such a theory? How does one
go about showing that it 'works'? Several suggestions come to
mind, but almost all are either insusceptible to statistical treat-
ment or else the necessary data do not exist.
One of the more significant and concrete ideas that such an
'institutional' approach suggests is the need, especially in the
"See,e.g., the rather interesting treatment of the Washington forecasts by
Jesse Friedman in the New York Time8 Sunday Magazine, Sept. 15, 1946, 'When
Economists Gaze into. the Crystal Ball'.318 PART IV
aftermath of war, to analyze consumption in terms of groups of
people rather than classes of commodities. 'While the latter is
essentially technological, taxonomic, or statistical in nature, the
former is necessarily conceived in terms of diverse social patterns,
the dynamics of motivation and response, etc.
No better example can be found than the obvious need for
studying the postwar income-spending-saving psychology of the
veterans. It is not enough to deal only with the 11 million men and
youths demobilized between V-J Day and the end of 1946. The
social behavior pattern we are concerned with involves additional
millions of civilians—wives and sweethearts, parents, even old
friends—whose desires and actions have been merged in greater
or lesser degree with those of the boys coming back home again.
At the time of or after discharge veterans have been treated fairly
liberally by the government as far as money payments are con-
cerned—these 'transfer' payments exceed the army or navy pay
previously earned. During the war large numbers of men in the
armed services saved regularly, even if in small amounts, chiefly
in the form of war savings bonds.4° Obviously no group in our
population underwent as much strain or suffered such deprivations
as the armed forces. There is abundant reason to have expected,
therefore what apparently has occurred, that demobilized veterans
have been consumer-goods hungry, eager for relaxation and good
times, eager to 'get away from it all'. Needing or strongly desiring
new clothing, wanting to take in sports, leisurely travel, and rec-
reational activity of all sorts, desiring to find a home and start a
family—requiring also furnishings and equipment—all these
factors have certainly operated to make of veterans and collateral
relatives perhaps the freest spending social group since V-J Day.
And as the number demobilized and the money income were much
larger than had been generally forecast in Washington, it is likely
that in the market effects of veteran spending we have an especially
important partial explanation of errors in the The
40SinceNational Service Life Insurance policies involve no true savings feature
and carry no cash surrender 'values, they are. not a factor.
4'Howthe labor market behavior of veterans also helps to explain the low levels
of actual unemployment (as currently defined and measured in the official Census
statistics) since V-J Day is shown in Appendix I, Tables 2—5.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 319
small numerical allowance made in the forecasts for such an effect
now appears to have been woefully inadequate.
But veterans cannot be the sole explanation. Industrial workers
in the war centers, some groups of farmers, government workers,
etc. must have felt a sense of relief from war accumulated fatigue
and tension, a diminishing of the pressure to abstain from spending
as they pleased, to save and buy war bonds, etc. Although a
'spending spree' psychology in the population at large is difficult
to define or measure, it is not unlikely that it has been operating.
There are many straws in the wind. As has been seen, the ab-
normally and unexpectedly large nondurables consumption has
been reflected in record retail sales. Particularly have the sales of
'luxury' items, despite high prices and excise taxes, been rising
further than ever above 'normal' relationships to income. Ex-
pensive types of clothing, jewelry, alcoholic beverages, restaurant
meals are among the items reflecting such a national
Attendance at sports events, recreational travel (by auto and by
public transportation), and other 'enjoyment' services have ex-
panded greatly since the war. The Liquid Assets Survey further-
more suggested, as noted, that people felt they would spend more
in 1946 than 1945 partly because they expected higher prices but
yet would not want to lower their standard of living. This insensi-
tivity to higher prices—in many cases even coupled with realiza-
tion of shoddy quality and 'bad buys'—has probably been much
greater in the postwar months than it normally would be. Con-
sumer debt has begun to rise significantly, as durable goods trickle
back even though at high and rising prices. Although there have
been instances of effective consumer resistance to high prices,
there has clearly been in general an enormous excess of demand in
all markets, contributing to higher price and larger money ex-
penditures.
Not oniy consumers but business men also have shared in the
typical postwar psychology, and by their bullish activities height-
ened the boom. The considerable excess of business investment in
new plant and equipment over the forecasts is in part due to
42SeeLouis Paradiso, 'Retail Sales and Consumer Income Since V-J Day', Survey
of Current Business, Oct. 1946.320. PART IV
speedier completion of reconversion and greater availability of
supplies. In part, however, and more significantly, it is due to
more intense demand arising from a bullish climate of opinion. A
rising trend of intentions to spend on plant and equipment is re-
vealed by the successive quarterly surveys conducted jointly by
the Department of Commerce and the Securities and Exchange
Commission covering all nonagricultural Actual esti-
mated outlays for the fiscal year 1946 turn out to be $9.0 billion—
considerably higher than expectations on V-J Day.
Similarly, the demand for goods to fill up inventory pipe lines
has been somewhat stronger and more sustained than was ex-
pected. Even allowing for price rises, the rate of real inventory
accumulation has been the highest ever recorded. Nevertheless,
because the tremendous market demand makes accumulation
difficult, actual inventory holdings have never become abnormally
large in relation to sales.44 Inventory holdings may even be some-
what larger than reported, because business men desire to conceal
swollen inventories or because new firms are not included in
current samples.
This active sustained business demand reflected a very powerful
undercurrent of optimism among men regarding the tran-.
sition period. For one thing, because they are closer to markets and
customers, they realized better than most economists the intensity
of needs and pent-up demands for countless consumer goods. In
other words, they grasped the underlying psychology of con-
sumers and encouraged it in various ways. They could not believe
that a serious 'slump' was around the corner just because the
government had stepped out of the market so fast—after all, they
had a large and growing volume of unfilled orders for peacetime
products. Everywhere there was evidence of a prosperity spirit—
plenty of 'restless' money, not too critical of either price or
quality.
The optimism with which the business community viewed the
a See the quarterly releases issued jointly by these two agencies, which show for a
sample of corporations the actual outlays for two quarters and expected outlays
for an additional two quarters.
Cf. B. S. Wilson, 'Postwar Role of Business Inventories', Survey of Current
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postwar world—at least for some time ahead—was evident also
in the behavior of the stock market. Before V-J Day the market
apparently had discounted completely the effect of cut-backs in
government military procurement programs—since these began
early in 1945, even before V-E Day, some of the shock had already
been absorbed. Anticipating the end of the war, the WPB already
in 1944 aided business in preparing for reconversion, allowing some
re-tooliiig, clearing of plants, etc. In the weeks just before V-J Day
the stock market sagged (Chart 5). However, from about V-J Day
on the steady and spectacular rise in the whole market was sus-
tained without serious break until February, when some big
strikes crippled production. Expectations of price increases, tax
reductions, and large volume sales apparently far outweighed in
business minds the impact of reduced government spending.
Given such a climate of business and consumer expectations,
how could virtually full production and full employment fail to be
maintained? Looking backward it seems incredible that we could
have missed the signs so badly. Since some can honestly say their
forecasts were more accurate even if less complete, less systemati..
cally and sophisticatedly arrived at, it will be instructive to see
what they predicted. Only a small and perhaps not representative
Isample—insideand outside government—can be touched on here.
Our chief aim is to examine their to the end of knowing
what lessons for the future can be learned from them.
OTHER FORECASTS
The Washington forecasts so far discussed represent the most
ambitious and concerted attempt to suggest the probable economic
pattern for the transition period. They proceeded, on the basis of
certain assumptions, by quantitative and mathematical methods
and relationships, to lay out a complete and internally consistent
set of projections for all important sectors of the economy. The
results have been thoroughly discussed above.
About the same time, that is, during the summer and early
autumn of 1945, many other economists were engaging in this
pastime of projecting postwar trends. Some kept their results
darkly secret. Others, in as well as out of Washington, felt repelled,322 PART IV
unconvinced by the deflationary prospects held out by the fore-
casters already discussed. From those who failed to convert their
hunches and intuitive insights into concrete or systematic sets of
forecasts we cannot easily learn anything concerning methods or
processes of analysis.
It is impossible, and hardly the purpose of this paper, to canvass
and analyze all the forecasts made before or around V-J Day by
economists and statisticians in government, business, labor, or
academic circles. This may be the task of some future economic
Instead I shall briefly discuss or mention oniy a few
sets of forecasts; they must serve as representatives for many
others.
Woytinslcy 's forecasts
Woytiasky has set forth his views in four substantial articles, col-
lectively entitled 'Postwar Economic Perspectives'.46 Basically,
his approach is historico-analytical rather than through the use of
systematic econometric methods ('model-building', etc.). Care-
fully and skilfully he marshalls the facts of experience concerning
the aftermath of World War I in terms of inflation and deflation,
boom and bust. References are made to other postwar periods, for
this and other countries. He concludes that it was highly im-
probable, indeed almost impossible, for deflation to set in after
World War II, as expected in the dominant Washington projec-
tions. Instead he strongly advances the thesis that an inflationary
boom was practically inevitable.47 Why?
A very useful tabular summary and comparison of many of these forecasts—
including projections to 1950 as well as for the transition period—appeared in
Business Conditions, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Oct. 1946. In an unpub-
lished discussion paper on the Consumption Function Controversy, prepared for
a Federal Reserve System Committee on Forecasting Techniques, Martin Bronfen-
brenner has some interesting comments on the forecasts and explanations of the
errors. See also Woytinsky, Journal of Political Economy, April 1947, p. 143.
46SocialSecurity Bulletin, Dec. 1945; Jan., Feb., and March 1946. MOst of the
material and analysis relevant to our discussion is in the last of the series. The
basic estimates and judgments were formed in the summer and early autumn of
1945.
,Social Security Bulletin, March 1946, p. 16: "However, the hypothesis of an
expansive economy in postwar years has not been picked up at random.. .. It
has been selected rather on the basis of economic and historical analysis that
pointed to this type of development as most probable."REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 323
First of all, any major war diverts a large share of the national
resources to the production of munitions and war goods. In the
face of inflated incomes and the expansion in total productive
activity originated by the war, civilian wants go unsatisfied. As a
consequence partly of goods shortages, partly .of positive induce-
ments, consumers save disproportionately large amounts of their
income; 'liquid assets' accumulate in various forms. But large
portions of them at least simply represent deferred spending—
they are 'tagged' in general for things temporarily gone without.
Or as Woytinsky aptly puts it, whereas in peacetime "a consumer
saves mainly for a rainy day. ..inwartime he saves mainly for a
bright day. He thinks of the day when the war will be over, when
new cars, refrigerators, washing machines, radios, and other
coveted durable goods will reappear on the market; when he
will be able to buy or build a home to his taste; when he again
can buy gasoline freely; when the horrors of war will no longer
interfere with his desire for leisure and ."48
Thiswas presumably the consumer motivation and psychology
during and after World War I; it appeared to be so on an even
greater scale during and after World War II. Wartime accumu-
lations of liquid assets were vastly larger than ever before in our
history; the backlog of demand for goods, for houses, for travel,
and education was apparently tremendous.
Not only was consumer demand active and high. Business firms
too had to abstain from expansionary investments in facilities, to
get along on thinner inventories than customary, etc. They too
had accumulated huge cash and security reserves out of war-
time profits.
Almost of necessity then, the economic system, after a long
hard war, tended to expand to the limits of its productive capacity
and mass unemployment was next to impossible. In the recent
war and its immediate aftermath there were additional special
factors differentiating the postwar outlook from, say, the situation
leading to the 1920—21 collapse. Prices were held under control
this time; rationing was quite successful. Consumers on the whole
disciplined themselves to new wartime restrictions and shortages.
Continued controls after V-J Day held inflationary forces in check,
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or at least within bounds, during the period when reconversion to
civilian production. was under way and supplies were quite string-
ent. It takes considerable time for civilian output to satisfy accu-
mulated demand; this time the backlog was far greater than in 1919.
A deflationary spiral, due to insufficiency of demand, is impossible
in this situation; the primary impact of a sharp cutback in war
expenditures never gets a chance to break into a round of second-
ary repercussions. Still another factor this time was the much
stronger postwar debt position of consumers: in the 1920's there
was a heavy accumulation of debts. On V-J Day consumer mott-
gage and short-term debt were at very low levels; consumers thus
entered the postwar period "with.solid titles to a higher standard
of Finally, the reconversion process this time, though a
larger undertaking than in 1919, had been better planned for.
Started earlier, it has been a longer and more gradual readjust-
ment, permitting smoother absorption of released manpower.
In this general climate of economic expectations, established on
general historical and qualitative grounds, Woytinsky set forth
his projections—actually forecasts—of labor force and unemploy-
ment. Methodologically itis particularly of interest that he
focused his attention on unemployment and derived his estimate
quite directly and independently. This is in sharp contrast to the
gross national product models, in which unemployment is a
residual and which so far offer little in the way of a systematic or
stable approach to the estimation of this crucial The
key to his method for the transition period was the judgment that
minimum frictional unemployment in a full employment situation
normally would be about 2.5 million persons. During the immedi-
ate postwar period, however, demand pressures were expected to
create an unusually tight labor market, causing him to forecast
unemployment below 2.5 million. In fact, he predicted that un-
Ibid., p. 23.
50Inprivate conversation with the author, Woytinsky ventured the opinion—
which he has subsequently published—that such a residual estimate o,f unem-
ployment might very well be subject to an error of 10 million—on an estimate of
say 2 to 8 niillion!—owing to the possible compounding of errors in labor force,
real gross product, and output per manhours. See his article on the forecasts,
Journal of PoliticaZ Economi,', April 1947, pp. 144—5.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 325
employment would increase 1.5 million between August 1945 and
August 1946, to a level of 2.3 million.6' The Census Bureau figures
show that it actually increased 1.2 million, i.e., to 2.1 million.
Careful analysis of labor market trends—demobilization, labor
force participation of veterans, exit from the labor force of women,
youth, and the aged, lay-off rates in munitions industries, and
reabsorption rates in the rest of the economy, etc.—led him to
forecast peak unemployment in March 1946, with a subsequent
• decline—almost precisely the pattern of events.52
•The significance in this instance is, I think, clear. There is no
substitute in many cases for specialized and intensive analysis of a
particular sector of the economy, based on its own characteristics
and evidence. Might this not apply also to the special area of price
behavior and relationships; to the area of consumption in some
measure; and to still other sectors in addition to the labor market?
How can the important and valid elements of such a segmental or
partial approach be most fruitfully blended with the still.valid and
powerful methods of the gross national product 'models'? How
can We most successfully combine the historical-qualitative view
'with the systematic mathematical-quantitative? In this direction,
apparently, lies our chief hope of raising the present imperfect
'science' of forecasting to a truer science.
Forecasts by theEconometricInstitute, Inc.
Weshall now briefly examine the forecasts of a private business
research and forecasting organization that sells its services to
Social Security Bulletin, March 1946, Table 13, p. 24.
52Withother elements of Woytinsky's forecasts this writer takes issue. For ex-
ample, he forecast a gross national product in 1944 prices for 1946 of $160 billion
(ibid., p. 17), $5 billion less than Hagen's estimate. Yet this was supposed to be
consistent with the forecast of more than full employment. What this implied, or
was based on, is a forecast of a much sharper decline in productivity—output per
hour—than that assumed by the 'model builders'. It is sharper also than has
occurred, due allowance being made for the crudeness of the data. Woytinsky
imputed far too much significance to the shift in output and employment from
munitions (chiefly durable goods manufacturing) industries to other sectors of the
economy. Analyses by Mosak and others fail to support this hypothesis. This is
not the place, however, for a more extended discussion of Woytinsky's analysis.
Interested readers should go directly to his writings.326 PART IV
business men and investors. The Econometric Institute, Inc., of
which Charles Roos is Chairman of the Board of Directors and
President, employs a considerable staff of trained statisticians and
econometricians. During the summer of 1945, in several issues of
its confidential weekly letter, Economic Measures, it analyzed
various elements of the then current situation and published fore-
casts for a year or so ahead on labor force, employment and un-
employment, income payments, etc.
Unfortunately—and quite understandably—the material sheds
little or no light on the underlying methods of analysis and pro-
It is not clear how much is based on qualitative judgment
or historical analysis, whether this group works with an essentially
complete mathematical model, a system of functional interrela-
tionships, trend analyses, etc. or uses a combination of these
approaches. Also, nothing is said directly about the nature of the
assumptions underlying the forecasts—particularly in the matter
of government policies on taxes, wage rates, price controls, etc.
The most informative and basic data are in Economic Measures
for August 30, 1945, devoted chiefly to analyzing and forecasting
labor market conditions after V-J Day. The data are available in
published In this s.et of projections, the total civilian labor
force in May 1946 was forecast at 54.2 to 55.2 million. The actual
Census MRLF figure (revised weights) is 57.2 on the new basis;
adjustment to the old MRLF basis would bring this to roughly
55.4. The size of the armed forces in May was oniy 3.4 million as
compared with a forecast of 5.5 million. The forecast of the total
labor force was thus about 2 million high. The more rapid de-
mobilization than expected: was offset by a greater decline in the
total labor force.
On the basis of a predicted minimum level of 170 for the FRB
total index of industrial production in the first quarter of 1946
A statement on the letterhead paper of the Index Number Institute, Inc.
(closely allied with the Econometric Institute, Inc.) notes that the forecasts
are reviewed and changed weekly "in accordance with current economic data
and scientifically accepted forecasting techniques".
"See bound Hearings on S(Full Employment Act 1945) before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, July to September 1945, pp.
906—12 (Government Printing Office; 1945).REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 327
(seasonally adjusted), the associated level of civilian employment
for May 1, 1946 was set at 52—53 million. This assumes a 38 actual
hours work-week in manufacturing and a work-week averaging 8
percent higher in other industries, and corresponds to a 'full-
employment' situation. Associated frictional unemployment is
thus 2.3 million. At the same time, May employment in manu-
facturing was forecast at 13.9 million.
The MRLF figure of unemployment for May was 2.3 million;
total civilian employment adjusted to the old MRLF basis was
about 53 million. The BLS estimate of employment in manufac-
turing was 14.2 million compared with 13.9 million forecast. This
comparison is not too meaningful; for, subsequent to the prepa-
ration of the Institute's forecasts, the BLS estimate of employ-
ment in manufacturing in May 1945 was revised from 15.3 million
to 16.3 million. The decline from May 1945 to May 1946, revised
basis, was 2.1 million as compared with a forecast decline of 1.4
million. The FRB index of industrial production was at160
instead of the expected 'minimum' 170, a difference consistent
with the larger than forecast decline in manufacturing employ-
ment.
In an earlier analysis (end of June) the Institute made some
over-all projections of national income by a few major industrial
sectors for the second half 1945 and the two halves of It
predicted also income payments and disposable income by months
through March 1946. The pattern of the forecasts was one of
gentle decline in total national income from V-J Day on into late
1946; in fact it was assumed that total private national income
would remain at a practically constant level, the fall in total
income coming almost entirely from military pay. Total national
income was actually $1 billion higher in the first half of 1946 than
in the second half of 1945. While total private income was $10
billion higher rather than equal to that in the second half of 1945.
As already mentioned, civilian employment was running higher
than forecast, although clearly this factor cannot account for the
entire difference in national income.
Again in terms of income payments, the forecasts mademid-
This material is copyrighted and quotation prohibited.328 PART IV
1945 by the Econometric Institute ran about $10 billion (annual
rate) lower than the actual figures show fOr the half-year October
1945 to March 1946—considerably closer than the Washington
'model-builders' came. There is again no way to analyze the fore-
cast or account for the error. Part of it is attributable to the fact
that military transfer payments per veteran ran substantially
higher than any of us expected.
Not all the elements in these various forecasts appear to be
fully consistent. It is impossible to go into the matter, owing to
lack of indicated methodology but it is to be• hoped that the
Econometric Institute will see fit to publish at least an outline of
their methods. The principal thing of interest to us is that these
predictions were correct about the general economic climate of the
transition. It expected inflation, not deflation; full or more than
full employment rather than mass unemployment; excessive and
generally sustained rather than deficient demand. In fact, it came
exceedingly close on labor market conditions, and even under-
estimated the inflationary factors on income.
CoNcLusIoNs
Both Woytinsky and the Econometric Institute assumed that the
situation after V-J Day was likely to be one of full employment,
with great stringency in the labor market. Thus unemployment
would be down to rock-bottom frictional levels. In making this
correct appraisal they obviously used different assumptions and
methods than the Washingtonmodel-builders. Presumably, too,
their methods were strikingly
Clearly, sole or chief reliance on gross national product models,
using mathematical relationships based• on the experience of the
'thirties, seems to be inadequate for forecasting in a rapidly chang-.
ing postwar transition.57 Those of us in Washington who did use
Anotherinteresting and basically correct forecast of the labor market and
employment situation after V-J Day is.a brief article by J. Steindi, 'The Transi-
tion in the TJnited States', Oxford Institute of Statistics Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 13,
Sept. 22, 1945; see especially p. 215. Steindi foresaw a postwar boom based essen-
tially on accumulated deferred demand, starting in spring 1946 and lastingto
years.
This is not to be taken too literally or categorically. Klein, using the econome-
tric model approach, did forecast an inflationary situation, low unemployment,REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 329
thisapproach of course alsointroduced judgment factors,
hunches, etc. But it is evident that there was much to be learned
•from the history of wars and postwar inflation; from closer
scrutiny of and better insight into consumer psychology, veterans'
behavior, etc. It is also clear that those who came closer to the
•mark for fiscal 1946 did so in part because they took a flyer on
forecasting price and wage-rate trends, tax changes, etc., either
explicitly or implicitly.
It will be instructive, and crucial, to see whether those who did
well in round one will continue to be successfuL Only from a series
of carefully annotated and dated experiments, the results of
which are observed and analyzed by economic forecasters, can we
collectively hope to make real progress in methods of prediction.
and considerably higher gross national product and consumer expenditures than
the Washington forecasts analyzed above. He kept his forecasts, made in summer
1945, under lock and key but ought now to be given due credit. It would be in-
structive if he too would publish his results and explain in some detail his assump-
tions and methods.APPENDIX I
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1Gross National Product, 1939—Second Quarter 1946
2Labor Force, 1939—Second Quarter 1946
3Gross National Product and Labor Force, First Half 1945
and Fiscal 1946
4Gross National Product and Labor Force, Third and
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Second Quarters 1946
6Disposable Income and Total Consumer Expenditures,
1929—1946
7Actual and Calculated Consumer Expenditures by Major
Components, 1939—1946
8Analysis of Consumer Expenditure Forecasts, Third
Quarter 1945 to Second Quarter 1946
9Autonomous Expenditures,ThirdQuarter1945to
Second Quarter 1946
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
Gross National Product, 1939—Second Quarter 1946











ACTUAL DATA OF COMMERCE)
88.6 16.0 10.9 61.7 67.7
1940 97.1 16.7 14.8 65.7 72.9
1941 120.2 26.5 19.1 74.6 88.7
1942 152.3 62.7 7.6 82.0 110.6
1943 187.4 93.5 2.5 91.3 124.6
1944 197.6 97.1 2.0 98.5 137.4
1945 199.2 83.6 9.1 106.4 139.6
1945I &II 206.6 98.2 5.1 103.4 141.6
1945III 198.2 81.0 11.2 106.0 137.9
1945IV 185.2 57.2 15.0 113.0 136.9





190.2 36.7 31.4 122.1 141.9
FORECASTS
206.2 100.7 4.5 101.0 139.6
1945III 190.0 83.0 7.4 99.6 132.0
1945IV 164.6 55.5 12.8 96.2 119.9
1946I 161.8 49.0 13.3 99.5 120.9
1946II 165.2 43.5 17.1 104.6 122.5
Because of rounding, totals may not add. The figures shown here for the first half
of 1945 were the official estimates at the time the forecasts were made.332 PARTIV
APPENDIXTABLE 2
Labor Force, 1939—Second Quarter 1946
First Half 1945 and Quarterly Data Seasonally Adjusted
(millions of persons)
Labor force Armed forces Unemployment
ACTUAL DATA
' 1939 54.1 44.9 .4 • 8.8
1940 54.5 . 46.5 .5 7.5
1941 55.7 49.1 1.6 5.0
1942 58.4 52.1 3.9 2.4
1943 . 62.5 52.4 9.0 1.1
1944 64.0 51.8 11.4 .8
1945 62.9 50.4 11.2 1.3
1945I &II 64.6 51.6 12.2 .8
1945III 63.4 50.0 12.1 •1.3
1945IV 60.8 49.7 9.2 1.9 •
1946I 59.2 51.3 5.2 2.7
1946II 58.7 • 52.7 3.4 2.6
.
1945I &II 64.6 51.6 12.2 .8
1945III 64.0 49.9 12.0 2.1
1945IV 63.2 46.1 10.8 6.3
1946I 62.8 .46.5 8.2 8.1
1946II 62.1 49.4 5.3 7.4
Actual data for 1941 through the first half 1945 are 'old' MRLF figures from the
Bureau of the Census, as published before the revisions introduced in July 1945
(8ee MRLF39,Sept. 20, 1945 for a discussion of the revision). Data for 1939 and
1940 are unofficial BLS estimates on a comparable basis. Figures for the third
quarter of 1945 through the second quarter of 1946 are based on the revised MRLF
series, as published after the introduction of revised weights in December 1946
(MRLF 54). They have been adjusted to eliminate seasonal variation and further
adjusted to 'old' MRLF levels.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 333
APPENDIX TABLE 3
Gross National Product and Labor Force







Gross national product 206.6 189.3 170.4 1.11
Government expenditures 98.2 53.6 57.8 .93
Federal government 90,4 45.3 49.8 .91
War 84.3 38.0 41.8 .91
Nonwar 6.0 7.3 8.0 .91
State and localgovernment 7.8 8.4 8.0 1.05
Privategross capitalformation 5.1 20.2 12.6 1.60
Construction 2.0 5.2 3.1 1.68
Producer durable equipment 5.6 9.1 6.5 1.40
Netchange in business inventories —1.6 2.1 2.5 .84
Net exports, etc." —.9 3.7 .6 6.17
Consumer goods and services 103.4 115.5 100.0 1.16
Durablegoods 7.2 10.3 10.1 1.02
Nondurablegoods 63.2 71.2 58.8 1.21
Services 32.9 34.0 31.0 1.10
(millionspersons)
Laborforce 64.6 60.5 63.0 .96
Civilian employment 51.6 50.9 48.0 1.06
Armedforces 12.2 7.5 9.1 .82
Unemployment .8 2.1 6.0 .35
Actual gross national product items are from the Department of Commerce.
Actual labor force figures are based on the MRLF data with rough unofficial ad-
j ustments both to allow for seasonal factors and to put them on a level comparable
with the old MRLF series, i.e., prior to July 1945,on whichthe projections were
based.Because of rounding, totalsmay not add.
aBillionsof dollars at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
b Also includes the small item exports and monetary use of gold and silver'.334 PART IV
APPENDIX TABLE 4
Gross National Product and Labor Force
Third and Fourth Quarters 1945


































Nonwar 6.6 7.2 .92 .6.78.0 .84




11.2 7.4 1.51 15.0 12.8 1.17
Construction 2.8 2.3 1.22 3.6 2.8 1.29
Producer durable equip- .
ment 6.7 5.0 1.34 8.3 6.0 1.38
Net change in business in-
ventories .3 1.0 .30 .84.0 .20





























Armed forces 12.112.01.01 9.210.8 .85
Unemployment 1.3 2.1 .62 1.9 6.3 .30
See Appendix Table 3 for sources, and notes.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 335
APPENDIX TABLE 5
Gross National Product and Labor Force
First and Second Quarters 1946

































Nonwar 7.3 8.3 .88 8.68.61.00
State and local government8.5,8.11.05 9.08.41.07
Private gross capital forma-
tion 23.113.31.74 31.417.11.84
Construction 6.5 3.31.97 8.0 4.11.95
Producer durable equip-
ment 9.5 7.0 1.36 12.0 8.01.50
Net change in business in-
ventories 3.4 2.01.70 4.03.01.33
Netexports,etc. 3.7 1.03.70 7.42.03.70
















































Unemployment 2.7 8.1 .33 2.6 7.4 .35
See Appendix Table 3 for sources and notes.336 PART IV
APPENDIX TABLE' 6





































































































Disposable income and actual expenditures are from the Department of Com-
merce. Data for 1929—38 from Survey of Current Business, May 1942; for 1939—40
from ibid., April 1944; for 1941—44 from ibid., Feb. 1946; for 1945—46 from ibid.,
Feb. 1947.
The calculated expenditures are based on the following relationship to dispos-
able income (t =givenyear minus 1935): total consumer expenditures =6.80
+ .050 t + .806 disposable income.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 337
APPENDIX TABLE 7




actual to calculated Actual Calculateda



























































































Disposable income and actual expenditures are from the Department of Com-
merce. Data for 1939-40 from Survey of Current Business, April 1944; for 1941—44
from ibid., Feb. 1946; for 1945—46 from ibid., Feb. 1947.
Calculated expenditures are based on the following relationships to disposable
income (t =givenyear minus 1935):
Durables=—3.50—.059t± .150 disposable income
Nondurables =3.51+ .095t + .427 disposable income
Services =6.79+ .014t + .229 disposable income
The data for disposable income are the same as those in Appendix Table 6.











Analysis of Consumer Expenditure Forecasts
Third Quarter 1945 to Second Quarter 1946
(dollar figures in billions; seasonally adjusted annual rates)







Services (exci. rent)b 27.5
$99.6$118.5 1.06 .89
8.0 16.6 ..92 .45
6.0 6.9 1.00 .87
60.4 63.4 1.08 1.03
25.2 31.6 1.09 .87
Fourth Quarter 1945
Totalconsumption 113.0 96.2
Durable goods 9.0 9.0
Rent 6.0* 6.0
Nondurablegoods . 70.6 57.7







Total consumption 121.0 99.5 118.6 1.22 1.02
Durable goods 11.7 10.5 16.6 1.11 .70
Rent 6.1* 6.0 6.9 1.02 .88
Nondurable goods 75.1 58.2 63.5 1.29 1.18
Services (cxci. rent)b 28.1 24.8 31.6 1.13 .89
Second Quarter 1946
Total consumption 122.1 104.6
Durable goods 13.1 13.0
Rent 6.1* 6.1
Nondurable goods 74.0 58.9






Actual data from the Department of Commerce. Forecasts represent those made
within the government August—September 1945 and presented by E. E. Hagen in
'Forecasting Gross National Product and Employment during the Transition
Period', Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Ten.
*Estimate.
a On the basis of the actual level of disposable income, the relationships are cal-
culated from the functions (t =givenyear minus 1935):
Total consumption exp. =6.80+ .050t + .806 disposable income
Durables =—3.50—.059t+ .150 disposable income
Rent 2.75 + .017t + .029 disposable income
Nondurables =3.51+ .095t + .427 disposable income
Services (excl. rent) =4.04—.003t+ .200 disposable income
The actual levels of disposable incomes are 1945 III, 137.9; 1945 IV, 136.9; 19461,
138.1; 1946 II, 141.9.
bIncludeexpenditures ofmilitary personnel abroadREVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTh 339
APPENDIX TABLE 9
Autonomous Expenditures
Third Quarter 1.945 to Second Quarter 1946










































































Actual data from the Department of Commerce.
aIncludes'Net exports of goods and services' and 'Net exports and monetary
use of gold and silver'.
bIncludesconsumer durables, rental payments, and expenditures for nondurables
in excess of the 'normal' relationship.APPENDIX II
Methods and Assumptions of the Washington Forecasts
The set of forecasts reviewed in this paper was generally repre-
sentative of a whole set'made by various government 'shops' in
Washington at the same time, i.e., near V-J Day.1 Common to all
were certain minimum2 assumptions for, the transition period,
chiefly concerning government expenditure, tax policy, transfer
payments policy, and demobilization; reliance on the analytical
framework of gross national product and national income, and the
use of 'model systems' of projection; and relatively heavy reliance
on mathematical, or at least implicit functional, relationships
among important sectors of the economy.
The general character of analysis applied has already been
discussed. Certain classes of expenditures, the autonomous, or
exogenous, elements, comprising in fact the greater part of gross
national product, were, assumed to be determined independently
of levelstotal economic activity, at least in the short-run tran-
sition period. Similarly, several items on the income-flows side of
the account were assumed to be knOwn in advance or estimatable
independently of the general situation.
Assumptions were made concerning the structure of federal
government policies and policy changes operating during the tran-
sition period. The forecasts were in terms of these policy assump-
tions, and warnings given that the results would differ so far as
different policies were adopted. In this very real sense the esti-
mates were model projections rather than
We now examine more closely the framework of analysis utilized
by Hagen and others.
1 Cf. .E. Hagen's paper in Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Ten.
Certainly this is true with respect to the basic methods of analysis and frame-
work of assumptions which were worked out in common through an interdepart-
mental committee centered in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion,
although specific numerical assumptions and results.differed in each set of projec-
tions. The differences, at least as far as fiscal 1946 was concerned, were incon-
sequential to the major conclusions and policy implications.noted earlier,
the set of projections with which Hagen is associated were in many cases 'better'—
though still badly off—than some of the other sets kept under wraps or at best
'leaked' unofficially. With one of these alternative sets the writer was closely
connected.
8Hagen, especially his introductory remarks.
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ASSUMPTIONS
1Price and Wage Controls
It was assumed that the general structure of price, wage, and
other stabilization controls would be necessary during at least the
early transition period, and would be retained and operate about
as it was on V-J Day. Since slowly rising prices, and some upward
Iwage-rateadjustments were characteristic of the wartime system
of stabilization controls, continuation of this trend also was
implied. Changes in the price level would be so small, in any case,
that they would not vitiate the projections made in terms of the
first half of 1945 (or in some cases 1944) price levels. No general
upward revision of price ceilings or wage rates was allowed for,
and no important areas of decontrol.
2Taxes
Hagen's projections involved the following assumptions:
a) At the beginning of 1946 the corporate excess profits tax
would be reduced to 65 per cent, and completely repealed in
1947. (Some of the other forecasters assumed full repeal for
1946; none, however, expected or assumed the further reduc-
tion of the effective rate of the combined surtax and normal
tax from 40 to 38 percent.)
b) Federal excise and customs tax rates (indirect business taxes)
would be reduced to 1942 levels in February 1946, with
further reductions in 1947. (Actual tax yields—at 1942 rates
—were treated as a function of consumer expenditures and of
disposable income.)
c) Federal personal income tax rates would be reduced effective
at the beginning of 1946 by repeal of the 'normal' tax, and by
the equivalent of about a 5 percent reduction in each surtax
rate bracket. (The actual reductions were more liberal in-
volving application to the normal tax of the surtax exemp-.
tion of $500 per exemption unit, the reduction of surtax rates
by 3 percentage points, and an additional 5 percent reduc-
• tion in the total tax liability as thus computed.)
d) Social insurance tax rates would remain at previous levels.342 PART IV
3Transfer Payments Policy
a) The levels of mustering-out pay and dependency allowances
per man in the armed forces assumed were multiplied by the
number demobilized or by the total in the armed forces
respectively to give aggregate military transfer payments.
b) Nonmilitary transfer payments were estimated chiefly on the
basis of an assumed $500 benefit per unemployed person.
4Other Assumptions
a) Income originating in government (all levels) was arbitrarily
estimated. Pay of the armed forces was estimated by multi-
plying the expected schedule for the size of the forces by the
estimated average pay per man. Civilian government em-
ployment and average pay was assumed; so also was interest
on the public debt.
b) Business reserves (chiefly depreciation) were largely assumed
at wartime levels, though varied slightly according to the
levels of gross national
AUTONOMOUS EXPENDITURES
1Government Expenditures for Goods and Services
a) War expenditures, munitions and construction, military pay-
roll and subsistence, etc., given by war procurement sched-
ules, demobilization policy, etc.
b) Nonwar expenditures, chiefly wages and interest, estimated
as noted above, plus other goods and services. State and local
outlays arbitrarily raised from wartime levels.
2Private Gross Capital Formation
a) Private construction (residential and nonresidential)—esti-
mated on the basis of expected labor and material supply
restrictions and bottlenecks; demand assumed adequate for
any conceivable supply.
b) Business outlay for new plant and equipment, a definitely
'mixed' category, partly based on an estimate of accumu-
lated needs and deficiencies during the war, a demand largely
independent of general economic conditions; partly based on
expected limitations of supply, especially for construction;REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 343
partly based on investment demand geared to current and
expected levels of activity. An upper limit for total invest-
ment in new plant and equipment—considered as an upper
limit on demand—was assumed largely on the basis of
Department of Commerce surveys of business intentions or
plans to invest during the year after V-E Day,4 and sketchy
analysis of wartime additions to our national productive
facilities.
On the whole it seems correct to say that the demand for or
at least expected outlays for such investment goods in the
aggregate was estimated as an autonomous expenditure.
However, some forecasters may have felt they treated it in a
derived fashion, related to gross national product, levels of
sales, etc., but employed no precise mathematical or quanti-
tative relationship. The practical effect of such alternative
formulations can safely be ignored, although the theoretical
force of the distinction is great, especially for the longer-run
analysis of postwar investment prospects.
c) Net inventory accumulation—assumed to be based on accu-
mulated wartime deficiencies of goods on the part of manu-
facturers, wholesalers, and retailers, with actual accumula-
tion limited by supply (rates of production) in the face of
active buyer demand. Rough allowance was made for partial
satisfaction of business demand for goods out of usable
government surpluses.
d) Net exports, etc.—based largely on assumptions about
United States foreign lending policy, conditioning effective
demand abroad for United States export goods, and assumed
levels of imports.
3Autonomous Consumer Expenditures
a) Durable goods—expenditures limited by available supplies
(rates of production), especially for major durables (autos,
etc.), and tight price controls. Although demand for many
minor durables was thought of as a derived item, the entire
durables category was in fact treated as autonomous.
4See Survey of Current Business, June and July 1945.344 PART IV
b) Rent—outlays for housing determined by supply and con-
trolled level of rents.
c) Excess nondurables, allowance arbitrarily made for special
deferred or replacement demand, chiefly by veterans for
clothing, etc., causing nondurables outlay to rise $2 billion
above the normal prewar relation with disposable income.
DISPOSABLE INCOME
a) For each half year (or quarter) after V-J Day a be-
tween disposable income and gross national product was
established hinging on the appropriate assumptions about
tax-rate policy, transfer payment policy, etc.. The amount, of
disposable income to be expected at various arbitrarily
selected levels of gross national product was worked out,
giving a set of 'observations' defining a simple (linear) func-
tion. Some components of disposable income (e.g., govern-
ment payroll, military and civilian, and military transfer
payments) were assumed invariant at all levels of gross
national product for any period; on the other hand, levels of
taxes, corporate and personal, vary with gross national
product and income payments under a given set of tax rates.
Similarly, business reserves, indirect business taxes, and
civilian transfer payments vary—each in its own way—with
changes in the levels of gross national product and income
payments. In the case of Hagen's projections, the various
assumptions worked out as follows, where Yd =disposable
income:
1945, second half: Yd =41.8+ .475 (GNP)
1946, first half:Yd =45.2+ .468 (GNP)
These functions were then applied in the solution of the
system for consistent levels of gross national product, in-
come, etc., as described below.
'DERIVED' CONSUMER EXPENDITURES
Normally, all consumption appears to depend closely on levels of
disposable income (in association with other factors, e.g., a timeREVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 345
trend). However, during the transition period outlays for durables
and for rent were assumed to be autonomous, owing to restricted
supplies.
Outlays for nondurable goods and for, services other than rent
were assumed to vary according to the prewar relation with dis-
posable income and time (in some of the models, with income
alone). This meant, given a relation between disposable income
and gross national product, that nondurables and services de-
pended upon gross national product and implicitly to the level of
autonomous expenditures. An 'excess' of nondurables above the
relationship and a diminishing 'deficit' of services below the rela-
tionship were allowed for.
SUMMARY: THE EQUATION SYSTEM USED IN THE MODEL
The system used in the projections is an extremely simplified and
truncated Keynesian model. It is simplified because no lags, rates
of change, cash balances, correction for price changes, etc. are
introduced. It is truncated in terms of a complete system of
mutually interdependent variables in that the greater part of
gross national product is treated as autonomous, and only con-
sumer expenditures for nondurables and services are derived from
a relationship with income. Given the aggregate level of income
associated with any gross national product, its distribution among
types of income share determined essentially on the basis
of regression relationships, arbitrarily modified. These figures,
however, were considered too shaky to be presented for pub-
lication.
The following terms and simple relationships give the essentials
of the model system used.
Basic terms
GNP =grossnational product or expenditures
Te= autonomousexpenditures
=governmentexpenditures for goods and services + pri-
vate gross capital formation (md. net foreign balance)
+ consumer durables + consumer rental payments +
'excess' nondurables expenditures
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=differencebetween GNP and income of indi-
viduals
corporate income and profits taxes + indirect business
taxes + corporate undivided profits + depreciation
and other business reserves + contributions to social
insurance funds—transfer payments + personal tax
and nontax payments (several of these items essen-
tially autonomous)
C total consumer expenditures




1) GNP =Te+ =+ Yd (basic identity equations)
.2) Yd =f(GNP) =a+ b (GNP) for given assumptions as to
tax and transfer payment policy; specifically,
(2a) Yd (1945 second half) =41.8+ .475 (GNP)
(2b) Yd (1946 first half) =45.2+ .468 (GNP)
3) =7.55+ .092 t + .627 Yd;t=(givenyear minus 1935)
(3a) (nondurables = 3.51 + .095 t + .427 Yd)
(3b)(services, exci. rent =4.04—.003t ± .200 Yd)
4) Substituting (2a) and (2b) respectively for Yd in (3), we get
(4a) Cnd (1945 second half) =34.7 .298(GNP)
(4b) (1946 first half) =36.8+ .293 (GNP)
5) Substituting these expressions forin equation (1) it is
possible to obtain, with a given level ofa consistent set of
estimates for GNP, Yd, C, Cnd, etc.
Estimates of Employment Unemployment (see Hagen, op.cit.)
1) Labor force—independently projected, on basis of judgment
-how fast the wartime abnormal bulge in labor force would dis-
appear. Size of the forces determined by demobilization
and recruitment schedules made available at the time by the
• Army and Navy.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 347
2) Employment
a) Average weekly hours in private nonagricultural industry
assumed by' Hagen to fall smoothly from 44.6 in the first
half of 1945 to 40 in the fourth quarter 1946, or 10 percent.
b) Productivity (output per manhour) in civilian industry
assumed by Hagen to fall 6 percent from the first half of 1945
to the third quarter of 1946.
c) Quarterly index of output per worker in civilian industry
constructed on basis of (a) and (b).
d) This index of output per worker (1945 first half: 100)
applied to actual dollar output per worker in first half of
1945. Resulting figures divided into projected civilian gross
product (GNP minus military payroll and interest on public
debt) gave the estimate of civilian employment. With the
size of the armed forces assumed to be known, total employ-
ment was thus obtained.
3) Unemployment =laborforce —totalemployment
In other sets of projections slight variations from the above
procedure were made. E.g., the trend of output per worker in
private nonagricultural industry was estimated on the basis of
judgment about the net effect of various factors; gross private
nonagricultural output was given by deducting from projected
gross national product the income originating in government
and an estimated agricultural gross product (based on rough
ratios to total gross national in the peak war years);
these two factors in combination gave employment in private
nonagricultural industry. The armed forces, civilian government
employment, and agricultural employment• were independ-
ently and arbitrarily estimated. The sum of all these com-
ponents gave total employment which, together with the pro-
jected labor force, gave the residual estimate of unemployment.APPENDIX III
Deflated Gross Product: Projections and Actual
All the comparisons between projections and actual developments
since V-J Day used data in current prices. The projections were
made onassumption of effective price controls; Hagen states
that his figures are assumed to be in the first half of 1945 prices.
(Other sets of forecasts were also couched in real terms., usually
stated to be 1944 prices.) He is careful to point out that changes in
relative prices would somewhat alter the structure of demand,
although properly depreciating the quantitative significance of
this factor if price changes are moderate. He felt that 'real'
government outlays for goods and services would be completely
in price. Demand for construction and investment goods
is likewise so large relative to possible supplies in the short-run
that the effect of even fairly large price increases could be assumed
to be of secondary importance.
The prewar functions used for estimating consumption expendi-
tures are of course in money terms, undeflated for price changes.
Implicitly this assumes unit price elasticity for total expenditure
and for each of the three major components dealt with. As a first
approximation this appears reasonable enough, and seems to fit
the historical data. It does make somewhat ambiguous the nature
of the consumption projections and of the implicit price-level
assumptions contained in them. (Similarly, the estimates of
national income and disposable income associated with the pro-
jected (real) gross national product are rather tentative and 'as is'
since they too are based on current money relationships rather
than real output relationships.)
Formidable statistical as well as theoretical obstacles stand in
the way of properly deflating gross national product and national
income series, especially in wartime or an immediate postwar
transition when the character and composition of production are
changing rapidly. Nevertheless, even a rough statistical attempt
is worth making for several reasons. It allows for a somewhat
more proper comparison of actual results with the forecasts. It
allows also for a rough check on the apparent actual trend of out-
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put per man or per manhour since V-J Day and the importance of
error in'this item in the forecasts of employment.
No detailed analysis is attempted here of price trends and real
output trends derived from deflated series. Instead we present
simply some crude deflated figures, unofficial and quite tentative,
and useful chiefly in suggesting that the price inflation factor
since V-J Day is not the predominant influence explaining the
error in the forecasts.
APPENDIX TABLE 10
Gross National Product, Actual and Forecast
























































































Appendix Table 10 compares the course of gross national
product and a few major components in current and first half 1945
prices for the fiscal year 1946 and for two selected quarters with
the forecasts (in first half 1945 prices).
The deflated figures in Appendix Table 10 were actually ob-350 PART IV
tamed by more detailed deflation of expenditure components. All
available price index series were used, but their nature is such
that little reliance can be placed in them. Nevertheless, they are
useful in suggesting roughly the trend of real gross national
product since the war.
The deflated private nonagricultural gross national product
implicit in the figures shown here is not identical with that used in
obtaining the output per manhour index discussed in Appendix IV.
The latter was derived by a somewhat different approach, not
permitting the showing of results by expenditure categories. The
results of the two attempts are reasonably similar, particularly in
view of the sizable error attaching to measurements of this type.
APPENDIX IV
Productivity Trends (Output per Manhour) since V-J Day
As noted in Appendix II, assumptions about postwar trends of
• output per man and per manhour were basic to the estimates of
civilian employment and unemployment. Hagen suggested thatREVIEW OF ECONOMIC FORECASTS 351
the net effect of the various factors tending to raise or lower output
per unit of labor input would be to reduce civilian output per
manhour 6 percent from the first half of 1945 to the third quarter
of 1946. The chief factors tending to raise output are less fatigue
when fewer hours are worked, withdrawal from the labor market of
less efficient workers, return of veterans in the prime of physical
vigor, and the introduction of new and better techniques and
equipment. The factors reducing manhour productivity are prin-
cipally a shift of employment from manufacturing to agriculture,
service, and trade industries; from more to less efficient industries
within manufacturing; and the temporary effects of the physical
reconversion process itself.
Using rough and unofficial figures on deflated gross product in
private nonagricultural industry and corresponding estimates of
employment and manhours, it appears that output per man fell 9
percent from the first half of 1945 to the second quarter of 1946;
output per manhour 6 percent.'
Hagen's assumption of a net 6 percent decline in output per
manhour in private nonagricultural industry and'in total civilian
output (including agriculture and civilian government) between
the first half of 1945 and the third quarter of 1946 was confirmed
by events. In view of the crudity of the concept and the measures
employed, this is striking. The trend in output per man likewise
appears to have been about as predicted. Within a sufficient
margin of error, therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that
only a small part of the error in the forecasts of employment—the
crucial item—can be attributed to the element of output per
worker or per manhour. Rather it was the misjudgment of the
• courseof total real output that led to understatement of employ-
ment and to a serious overstatement of unemployment.
1Stillother estimates made on a slightly different basis suggest a somewhat
sharper drop in output per manhour from the first half of 1945 to the second
quarter of 1946 (about 10 percent). They tie in with the real gross national product
estimates in Appendix III. A forecast of a 10 rather than a 6 percent decline in
output per manhour, cet. par., would have led to a civilian employment prediction




Mr. Sapir's paper on the forecasts for the transition period is
highly competent and thorough. Since I am in substantially com-
plete agreement with its contents I have little to say in the way
of critical disapproval. I prefer to confine my remarks to the
elaboration of some points mentioned by Sapir.
Whiledo agree with most of the technical details of Sapir's
paper, I feel that on one matter his emphasis has been somewhat
misplaced. He stresses the idea of forecasting as an art rather than
as a science. If methods of forecasting are not made scientific, we
are, indeed, in a sorry state. The main interest in forecasting, at
present, is for its use as an instrument of public economic policy.
If an artist is required in order to use the forecasting instrument,
we had best search for new instruments. Economic policies must
be made independent of particular artists and must be obtained
from tools that will yield the same result in the hands of different
manipulators. If forecasting is to be used in formulating economic
policy, scientific methods must be developed. The quantitative
statistical (econometric) methods developed in recent years have
the property of being scientific, and I feel that the best way to
develop the science of forecasting is to develop econometric
methods. Sapir, of course, discusses the fate of econometric
methods for the transition period forecasts and considers various
ways in which these methods might have been better utilized; at
the same time, he lays great stress on various 'fuzzy' methods not
easily adapted to scientific treatment.
The appropriate procedure in forecasting by econometric
methods is: (1) Construct a mathematical model of the economic
system. The components of this model fall into four categories:
technological equations, economic behavior equations, legal rules,
and definitions. Technological equations are, for example, the
input-output relationships, technically called production or trans-
formation functions. These equations act usually as constraints
upon the movement of the system. Allowance must be made in
them for technological change. The economic behavior equations
are those that depict the actions of the fundamental units of theCOMMENT 353
system (households, business firms) within the framework of a
particular type of market system and mode of production. Ex-
amples of economic behavior equations are the familiar profit
maximizing equations of the firm or the consumer demand equa-
tions of the household. The legal rules act as constraints autonom-
ously imposed upon the system by the government. A tax law
is an example of a legal constraint. In mathematical form this law
may state that taxes are a function of income. Taxes and income
are variables of the equation system, but the parameters of the
functional relation between these variables are determined by
governmental action. Since households and business firms must
operate within the framework of the particular legal rules in ex-
istence, these rules become constraints upon the economic behavior
decisions of these units. Finally, the definitions are introduced for
accounting purposes. They state, for example, that the rate of
change in the stock of fixed capital equals net investment or that
national expenditures equal the sum of expenditures by con-
sumers, business firms, and government. The definitions express
exact relations among the variables of the system, but the tech-
nological and economic behavior equations are not exact; they
are subject to a multitude of disturbances. The agricultural pro-
duction functions may not give the correct input-output relation-
ship if there is a large uncontrollable disturbance in the weather;
consumers may not spend according to their customary patterns
if there are temporary shortages of necessities. Endless disturbing
factors cause the observations to deviate from the equations of the
system. The legal rules, in principle, could be made into exact rela-
tionships without error, but a complete representation of laws will
often lead to complicated equations. Consequently, approxima-
tions are usually substituted for the true legal rules and these
approximations are subject to errors of estimation. For example,
the highly complex laws on personal income taxation cannot be
exactly represented by a simple linear relationship between total
taxis and total income for the entire community. The approxima-
tion function will have to make allowance for a margin of error.
(2) After the mathematical model has been established, the
econometrician uses the past data to estimate the parameters of354 PART IV
the equation system. The disturbing factors are always present,
and it is possible to estimate the difference between the observa-
tions of the past data and the values of variables calculated from
the estimated equations. From the difference, an estimate of the
disturbances, the average variation of the disturbances in the past
can be determined; this should give us some idea of the amount of
variation to expect in the future. For the period of forecast some
variables are usually known in advance—government expendi-
tures, tax rates, population, lagged variables, controlled prices,
etc. If the values of these predetermined variables are inserted into
the estimated statistical equation, estimated values of the other
variables in the system can be obtained for the forecast period.
A forecast from such a statistical model is not exact because the
equations upon which the forecast is based are not exact. Essen-
tially two types of error are involved, and proper allowance must
be made for both. The econornetrician estimates the parameters
of his model equations from a sample of past data. The parameters
are not known precisely because they are estimated from a finite
sample (often small, say 20 years' observation, in econometric
work). There are, however, mathematical statistical methods of
estimating the sampling errors involved in the determination of
the parameters of the model. In addition to the sampling fluctua-
tions, there are the above mentioned disturbances in the equations
of the system. The fluctuations of the disturbances can be esti-
mated from the past observations. By combining the two types of
error, a single error can be attached to the forecast of economic
variables from the statistical model. This gives a range of forecast
rather than an unique point. It is customary to make some as-
sumptions about the population distribution patterns of the error
terms, and if this is done, a definite probability can be assigned to
the chance that the forecast will actually be in the computed
Nothi.ng in this method is 'fuzzy', yet I believe that many of the
'fuzzy' matters that bothered Mr. Sapir are properly dealt with.
'Detailed examples .of all the steps in this approach are given in the author's
paper, 'The Use of Econometric Models as a Guide to Economic Policy', Eco-
nometrica, Vol. 15, 1947, pp. 111—51.COMMENT 355
The disturbances, like Sapir's 'fuzzy' phenomena, are not directly
measurable, but their average variation can be estimated from the
past behavior of the system. For the interwar period the disturb-
ances represent the aggregate effect of the post World War I
buyers' strike, the development of new industries (automobiles,
radio, refrigerator, talking films), the formation of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, the strikes of the late 'thirties, the begin-
fling of World War II, the Spanish War, the Sino-Japanese War,
etc. A very large number of events caused people to deviate from
their estimated behavior patterns. The estimated disturbances
obtained from the interwar period should not be much different
from the postwar disturbances. In the postwar period there were
strikes,decontrol,shortages, and many other disturbances.
Though these factors were large, it hardly seems possible that they
add up to more than the disturbances of the interwar period. Dur-
ing the war there were direct controls (i.e., new legal rules), and
consequently many of the equations of the model were virtually
suppressed, but during 1946, many of the direct controls were
removed. The best estimate of the disturbing factors would seem
to come from the past estimates of these factors. In this way, some
of the qualitative variables, cited by Sapir, are accounted for in
the forecasts even though they are not directly observable. It is
wrong to think that the econometric method ignores the qualita-
tive variables. On the contrary, the econometric methods attempt
to account for these variables scientifically.
There is an essential difference between the models of the inter-
war and postwar transition periods, on the one hand, and the war
•period, on the other hand. The war may be looked upon as a large
disturbance which should be incorporated into the model, but this
has not been the procedure of econometric model builders. If the
models were based on the data of several centuries covering several
•wars, this approach could conceivably be adopted, but since our
data contain at most two wartime observations it seems preferable
to treat a war economy differently. During World War II new
legal rules and new types of market were imposed upon the system.
The wartime and peacetime models differed essentially in struc-
ture; hence the wartime data were not used to determine the.356 PARTIV
parametersof the statistical model. Except for certain known
controls in specific markets 1946 was assumed to be like the inter-
war years in all structural characteristics. The econometrician
should take into account any disturbances definitely known in
advance for the period of forecast. If he knew, for example, the
extent of demobilization in 1946 he should have taken it into
account; however, the various disturbances that are not known in
advance can be accounted for only in the random perturbations
which are part of the. econometric models and which have been
estimated (in terms of average variation) the past data.
Changes in the structural characteristics of the system must, of
course, be separated from random disturbances. If changes are
known in advance with certainty, they cannot be incorporated
into the random disturbances.
Sapir has pointed out that the appropriate forecast intervals for
gross national product may cover a range that includes more than
one type of policy. This may be true, but it does not mean that
such forecasts are not useful. If the forecast of gross national
product is such that there is a 70 percent probability that GNP
will in some future period be in the range $170 ±$13billion (in
fixed prices), where $195 billion corresponds to full employment,
the type of policy recommendation seems obvious—one of expan-
SjOfl.2 The size of the expansionary policy cannot be determined
from a consideration of the forecast range and the full employ-
ment GNP alone. However, if the cost of instituting programs of
different quantitative magnitudes and the cost of adopting a policy
to combat deflation when the true situation is inflation (the prob-
ability that the forecast interval will include the observed point is
70 percent) are knàwn, the size of the anti-deflationary policy to
be adopted can be chosen. Similarly, appropriate anti-inflationary
policies can be selected if the entire forecast interval exceeds $195
billion.
If the interval includes $195 billion it may appear that no appro-
priate policy can be chosen because the interval includes the possi-
bilities of both inflation and deflation. If all costs other than thOse
2Itis assumed, for purposes of illustration only, that 70 percent is a significant
probability level. The risk that is to be run must be decided upon in advance.COMMENT
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of being unprepared to combat inflation or deflation are disre-
garded as unimportant, the policy is obvious: give anti-inflationary
agencies enough resources to combat the worst possible inflation
inside the forecast interval and give anti-deflationary agencies
enough resources to combat the worst possible deflation inside the
forecast interval. If the cost of instituting different policies and the
costs of choosing the wrong policy are known and taken into
account, an appropriate policy can be chosen also for the case in
which the interval covers the full employment level of GNP.
The fact that a forecast of GNP may involve an error of as
much as ± $13 billion at the 70 percent probability level should
not discourage policy makers from using econometric methods.
Both types of error make substantial contributions to the total
error. In some models I have found that the contributions of the
sampling fluctuations and of the disturbances are approximately
equal. The sampling fluctuations are specific to the econometric
method, but can be reduced by improving the data, i.e., by getting
more observations and more reliable observations. We can0 hope
to reduce much of the error if the official data collecting agencies
realize the importance of the forecasting problem and provide the
econometricians with better source material. By way of specific
suggestion, it be extremely valuable if the time series used
to estimate the parameters of the models could be extended quar-
terly back to 1900. The other type of error, the disturbances in
behavior patterns, is not specific to econometric methods. These
errors are part of the structure of the economic system and will
be present in any method of forecasting. It is an important con-
tribution of the econometric method to estimate the variation in
these disturbances0 (they are not directly observable) and show
approximately how large they are. If economic activity is subject
to big perturbations in our present type of system, we must realize
this fact and take it into account in our policies. The large disturb-
ances estimated by the econometric models emphasize the need for
good economic policies, thereby eliminating the great uncertainties
now present. Instead of discouraging the policy makers, the large
disturbances, as estimated from the econometric models, should
spur them on to intensified activity.358 PART IV
EVERETT E. HAGEN
In 'The Reconversion Period: Reflections of a FOrecaster' (Review
of Economic Statistics, May 1947), I commented briefly upon the
forecasts for the reconversion period. Several comments I would
make concerning Mr. Sapir's manuscript are implicit in that
article. it shall add here only three brief statements.
1) Though Sapir refers to the "Washington forecasts", he dis-
cusses only one, that by me, which is not in all respects typical of
others. I regret he has not treated others; especially the one with
which he was closely associated.
2) I wish to express my hearty concurrence with Klein's com-
ments concerning the possibility and the need for developing eco-
nomic forecasting as an econometric science. This way lies prog-
ress.
3) Klein refers to the inevitable disturbances in the system of
equatiéns on which a forecast is based. It is not necessary, how-
ever, to accept as inevitable the margin of error in forecasting
caused by these disturbances. That error may be reduced by the
improvement and expansion of surveys of investment intentions.
Capital formation requires planning. It therefore can be known
before the event. The event, it is true., differs from plans made
some time earlier because men do not correctly anticipate their
own reactions to a given set of circumstances, and because changes
in expected economic conditions cause revision of plans. It may
well be possible, however, to discover by experience (aided by
a priori judgment) the appropriate adjustment for these two fac-
tors, so that investment intentions can be used as a basis for a
fairly accurate short run forecast of capital formation. In this way,
investment can be forecast from actual intentions rather thanT
from the economic data that ordinarily determine intentions, so
that error due to disturbances in the investment equations can be
reduced. The improvement of surveys of investment intentions
may well be the most important single step that can be taken at
present toward improving forecasting techniques.
CLAYTON GEHMAN
Mr. Klein has pointed out some of the difficulties of the early gross
national product models and has said in an article in the JournalCOMMENT 359
of Political Economy for August 1946 that we should not prema-
turely despair of determining from observed data the investment,
inventory, housing, etc. functions in order to inject dynamic ele-
ments into this system of forecasting.
On this viewpoint I have three comments. First, I agree heartily
that the strategic factors in the economic situation should be
studied intensively. In some instances this requires compilation
of better basic data, in others, more competent analysis. It seems
to me that the technology of compiling statistics has improved
more rapidly in recent years than the analytical capacity to exploit
them. Also, I would like to emphasize that analysis should not be
confined to information that can be treated quantitatively. Devel-
opments often become of strategic importance in the economic
situation primarily because their influence is not measurable,
especially in advance.
Second, the real world of fact is continually undergoing struc-
tural changes. The burden of evidence appears to be that in any
critical period the influence of the unique factors is more impor-
tant than the persistence of established relationships. A system
of forecasting that works oniy when there are no abnormal con-
ditions has decided limitations.
Third, forecasters cannot wait until a system is perfected. Called
on every day to present their judgments concerning the future,
they must select the approach and the data that promise the best
results in the time allowed them.
Before discussing some of the specific limitations in using gross
national product models to forecast changes in the economic situ-
ation, I think it probably fair to say that most compilers and users
of the GNP would be among the first to point out that it does not
describe the economic world completely and that it must be sup-
plemented if economic fluctuations are to be analyzed. Also, I
think it important for us all to acknowledge the great usefulness
of the work in that field, even though some of us have grave
doubts about the predictive value of the GNP models. Business
forecasts in the past would probably have been more accurate if
•reliable estimates of the GNP had been currently available.
In my opinion there were several serious limitations in the use360 PART IV
of the GNP models to forecast economic developments in the tran-
sition period; these limitations would generally apply also in fore-
casting for any period marked by pronounced changes in .the eco-
nomic situation. I shall mention briefly some of these limitations
without attempting to list them in the order of their importance.
1) The availability of the model data only in dollar terms would
not have been especially serious if it were possible to compile accu-
rate price series. The importance of this consideration was, as I
see it, strikingly demonstrated in the forecasts made in 1945. Most
persons, including many not using the models, were impressed
by the unusually high level reached by deflated consumer expend-
itures during the war, especially for nondurable goods. As a result,
they found it difficult to believe that consumer buying would ex-
pand after the war except chiefly for automobiles, appliances, and
houses.
2) The assumption of constant prices was quite misleading
inprices were in prospect. It is true that
one of the assumptions under which the models were developed
was that price controls would remain effective, but the question
whether, and by how much, controls would become ineffective,
was an essential part of the economic forecast.
3) Another problem was that the changes shown by the figures
used in the models could be determined by either demand or
supply conditions and it made a great deal of difference in the
business would be dominant. For example, a small
figure for inventory changes has an entirely different signifi-
cance if it reflects inability of manufacturers and distributors
to get sufficient goods than if it reflects an attempt to reduce inven-
tories.
4) The models could not indicate the importance of orders in the
situation. Many goods are ordered far in advance, sometimes
because they take long to produce, sometimes because buyers are
concerned about supply and price protection. In either case the
orders, or their absence, profoundly influence the markets for raw
materials, equipment, and labor long before they show up in the
expenditure figures.
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summarized in broad aggregates and no notion of the strategic
significance of some of the components was conveyed by the dollar
amounts. For example, during the early part of 1946 net merchan-
dise exports were a small proportion of total GNP but gross ex-
ports of scarce food supplies were sizeable and no doubt added
considerably tospeculativeactivities in domestic markets.
6) The practice of showing an evenly graduated development
of affairs tended to create the illusion, that the pattern of events
would be orderly while at that very moment most people recog-
nized that the situation was basically disorderly.;
7) While the models provided an accounting in advance of how
production and income could be balanced at certain levels, the
levels themselves were projected on the basis of numerous assump-
tions, some explicit, many implicit. The internal consistency of the
arithmetic of the models, however, provided no check whether
the assumptions were realistic.
8) The models, based as they were on measures of current output
and income flow, did not provide a statement of the important
balance sheet items such as inventory holdings, plant capacity,
and the money supply. Information regarding the over-all size of
these items here and in foreign countries and their distribution by
type of asset or type of holder was of crucial importance. Another
important balance sheet item for the economy is the nation's good-
will, and the actions taken to foster it at home and abroad often
have had profound economic effects. It must be admitted, how-
ever, that political considerations cannot be anticipated accu-
rately by any system of forecasting.
MOItRIS A. COPBLAND
Both Sapir and Klein suggest a contrast between the type of busi-
ness forecast that is based on one or more model analyses and the
type that bases a considered judgment on all the pertinent facts
deemed important. For convenience these two types may be re-
ferred to as 'model' and 'judgmental' forecasts.'
Sapir speaks of the latter as "forecasts of those whose method depended more
explicitly on general qualitative considerations, etc." Klein uses the term "arm-
chair comments" (Cowles Commission Papers, New Series, No. 18, University of
Chicago, 1946, p. 302) in contrasting what is here referred to as a 'judgmental'362 PART IV
Klein, less modest than Sapir in his claim for model forecasting,
takes Sapir to task for speaking of model forecasting as an art. He
urges that in a model forecast the findings for the future as of any
date have scientific objectivity, while judgmental forecasts are
subject to the judgmental whims of the individual forecaster. He
does not mean, I take it, that the element of judgment does not
enter into model forecasts. Rather, it enters in large part at an
earlier stage. The forecaster exercises judgment in the selection of
models. If the forecaster is employed by government or by a busi-
ness enterprise or private organization the executive or adminis-
trative officer exercises judgment in selecting the forecaster. But
once the forecaster has been employed and has his models,
Klein would apparently urge, his findings are not subject to the
eccentricities of the individual forecaster's judgment.
The category 'judgmental forecasts', it must be admitted, is less
clearly defined than the category 'model forecasts', and 'judg-
mental forecasts' differ widely in dependability according to dif-
ferences in the quality of the forecasters' judgment as well as
differences in their command of relevant facts. But clearly this
says nothing about whether 'model forecasts' are in general more
dependable than judgmental forecasts. Model forecasters seem
sometimes to forget that several V-J Day judgmental forecasts
were more nearly correct than the model forecast that has received
so much attention.2
'Objectivity' in the sense in which model forecasts possess it and
judgmental forecasts do not is not necessarily a virtue. It is a good
talking point in selling a model forecast technique to an adminis-
trator, because it makes the technique sound as if it were scientific.
But if two models have provided equally good fits to past data and
one is currently malapropos, the malapropos model is as 'objective'
as the other. Moreover, the 'objectivity' of model forecasts is not
scientific objectivity in the sense that it commands general accept-
forecast with the model approach. If such an epithet is to be applied to either
judgmental or model forecasts it would seem to be applied more appropriately to
the latter since they have tended to substitute a priori findings for a direct ex-
amination of all the relevant facts.
2 Sapir recognizes these judgmental forecasts in a footnote.COMMENT 363
ance by competent economists. And it will not become scientific
objectivity unless and until model forecasting generally displaces
judgmental forecasting and unless and until one model is generally
accepted as the best model for a forecast under specified circum-
stances (the complete specification of circumstances having been
generally agreed to in advance of their occurrence).
But does a model forecast really eliminate the judgment of the
forecaster? When Klein suggests modification of a computed pro-
jection in the light of relevant facts becoming available subsequent
to the computation, he is surely admitting an important element
of judgment. Again, when he tells us that a model may be a good
fit in one period and not in another, he admits a further element of
judgment. The forecaster must judge whether the model will de-
scribe the period ahead. And judgment is likely to be involved in
the application of a model to any specific problem. Is it, for ex-
ample, wise to use an annual model to forecast the first half of
calendar 1947 by deducting from the fiscal year projection a figure,
partly actual, partly judgmental forecast, for the last half of cal-
endar 1946? Would it be wise to use an annual model to forecast
the second quarter of 1947 by deducting a figure for the three pre-
ceding quarters from the fiscal year projection?
Nor is this the end of the matter. Two classes of autonomous
variables are used in model forecasts: (a) variables referring only
to the past, e.g., fiscal year 1946 disposable income, and (b) vari-
ables involving the future, e.g., fiscal year 1947 investment. The
former may fairly be regarded as objectively determinable. But
the determination of the latter is essentially a judgmental fore-
cast.3 Thus model forecasts are necessarily based on judgmental
forecasts, unless the model is such that all autonomous variables
refer oniy to the past.
To one who seeks objectivity, this presents a problem. Klein's
solution does not seem altogether satisfactory. He offers us not
a single projection, but a whole table of projections based upon
different judgmental forecasts of investment and prices. This pro-
Klein refers to this second class of autonomous variables only incidentally.
He characterizes some as "variables, .. knownin advance—government ex-
periditures" (the italics are mine).364 PART IV
cedure does not avoid the judgmental forecasting of autonomous
variables. Essentially it amounts to offering nOt a definite pro-
jection, but a range of reasonable values for his judgmental fore-
casts of these autonomous variables. The wider the range the
larger the number of forecasters who will accept it. Also, the wider
the range the less useful the forecast, and the more the forecaster
leaves to the presumably less competent judgment of his reader.
If the buck is not to be passed to the reader, the range must be
narrow enough and Klein's judgmental forecast of investment and
prices definite enough to give unambiguous answers to such ques-
ions as: Is the GNP likely to be higher or lower in the first half of
1047 than in the last half of
Thus far it has been argued that model forecasts inevitably
depend upon the judgment of the forecaster. But a model can give
a forecaster a false sense of security, can lead him to avoid using
his judgment about pertinent facts when such avoidance is unfor-
tunate. This, I think, is the real lesson of the V-J Day forecasts.
Model forecasts can give us projections of derived variables (e.g.,
disposable income and consumer expenditures) without requiring
us to make direct judgmental forecasts for these variables. But
such projections are not a satisfactory substitute for direct judg-
mental forecasts of such items as disposable income and consumer
expenditures based on current information about transfer pay-
ments, deferred demand, wartime savings, etc. A model affords a
very important check on the consistency of one's forecasts of the
various debit and credit components of GNP, but it does not
relieve the forecaster of the obligation to use his best judgment in
providing direct judgmental forecasts of all the components (de-
rived as well as autonomous) in the light of all the relevant facts
at his disposal.
AsIhave implied, there has been a tendency for some fore-
casters to specialize in the model approach, avoiding direôt judg-
mental forecasts of the variables they have regarded as dependent,
and for other forecasters to specialize in judgmental forecasts on
the basis of an extensive factual inquiry, avoiding making model
I have encountered at least one advocate of Klein's model who vigorously as-
sertedthat Klein's forecast for the first half of 1947 did not answer this question.COMMENT 365
forecasts. This unfortunate type of specialization is the modern
counterpart of the old divergence between the a priori and the
empirical approach. Model forecasts clearly rely heavily upon a
priori reasoning. Judgmental forecasts also use logical inference,
but their chains of reasoning are less involved and their considera-
tion of facts is often much more extensive.
The moral of these comments seems clear. No forecaster should
specialize in either model or judgmental forecasts. The two ap-
proaches to forecasting should not be separately used; rather each
approach should be used to complement the other.
RUFUS S. TUCKER
Mr. Sapir's paper is an able one on the technical level; as he prop-
erly points out, passably good economic forecasting is at present an
art rather than a science. He seems, however, to share with Mr.
Klein the belief that forecasting can be made into a real science;
and in fact seems to believe that the time when that will occur is
not far distant. On this I must take exception. Since the days of the
early Babylonian star gazers, imaginative thinkers have indulged
the hope that prophecy might become a science, and have fre-
quently persuaded themselves and others that that desirable goal
had already been attained, or at least was just around the corner.
If the word scientific is stretched to include everything that in-
volves complicated formulae and specialized jargon understood
only by experts, the goal has indeed been attained. But if it is
restricted to a body of theory that is not only inherently logical
but consistent with known facts, and that can be put to practical
use so as to yield reliable results without the intervention of acci-
dent or the addition of sound 'unscientific' judgment, then I be-
lieve the goal will never be attained.
•As I see it, the chief reason the government forecasters for 1946
were so wrong is that they were attempting an impossible task
with inadequate tools and in the light of an unsound economic
theory. I much prefer Mr. Woytinsky's approach, which is similar.
to the approach every intelligent man uses in connection with
his personal or business problems, i.e., to study the present in the
light of the past, making as sure as possible of the facts, statisticall366 PART IV
and other, and attempting to give proper weight to the resem-
blances and differences between the past and the present. Among
the most important facts are purely psychological ones which can-
not be measured statistically, or at least not in such a way as to
make historical comparisons reliable. And especially a wise statis-
tician who attempts to be really scientific, and not merely appar-
ently so, will rigorously refrain from putting any reliance on re-
sults obtained by extrapolation of regression formulae. He will
also be suspicious of any estimates of long-time trends that are
based either on short periods which may be dominated by cyclical
movements or on sufficiently long periods if the data are inade-
quate or incorrect. -
Itis probably not appropriate to include in this volume any de-
scription of the projection I published in January 1945; but since
Mr. Sapir referred to two other projections, I would like to point
out that this one of mine, although prepared almost a year earlier
than Mr. Hagen's and by much less superficially scientific
methods, was closer to being correct, especially in the items private
capital and consumers' expenditures. The figures in Table 10
of my Projections of National Income, published in the National































January 1945, have been converted into early 1945 dollars and the
average for 1945 and 1946 taken to represent the fiscal year 1946.
The money figures representing actuality, except for disposableCOMMENT 367
income, and Hagen's forecasts are from Appendix Table 10 of Mr.
•Sapir's report. My original projections were in 1935—39 dollars;
they were converted into early 1945 dollars on the assumption that
the general price level had risen 50 percent, the assumption I then
had in mind, although I did not state it in my article. My estimate
of 4,150,000 unemployed is not far off if the veterans in schools
and in the 52-20 club are regarded as unemployed. Both Mr. Hagen
and I were fooled by the rapid reduction of government expend-
itures and taxes.